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The aim of this paper is to contribute to scientific research in the field of examining the shortcomings in the use of strategic communication for armaments. A comprehensive approach that rationalises the political, military, economic and technical decision-making process, as well as appropriate strategic communication with stakeholders, is required for the procurement of military equipment for the armed forces. The paper first analyses the existing shortcomings in the use of strategic communication in support of armaments, and then recommends a model for the adequate use of it. The results of a questionnaire survey and structured interviews with specialists in strategic communication and armaments show a high level of support for the use of strategic communication. However, the selected case studies on the Pandur and BVP modernization projects did not confirm the assumption of an improvement in the ability of the Czech Ministry of Defence to acquire new military equipment.

The information revolution is affecting the whole spectrum of conflict. Here the authors advance an ambicous idea of "swarming" that may emerge as a definitive doctrine that will encompass and enliven both cyberwar and netwar. Swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions. Swarming depends on a devolution of power to small units and a capacity to interconnect those units that has only recently become feasible, due to the information revolution. The idea of swarming stands for engaging an adversary from all directions simultaneously, either with fire or in force.

The article deals with selected international treaties, current agreements and international cooperation initiatives in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, in which the Czech Republic is represented through specific bodies or ministries. There is also a general description of the view and the specific military approach. The involvement of the MoD and the Czech Armed Forces in NATO structures enables to influence the strategic decision-making in the area of CBRN and thus support the current trends concerning forensic analysis, sampling of CBRN samples and response to new trends in the field of WMD elimination.

This article deals with the Czech defence industry and its role in the defense policy of the Czech Republic. The basic goal of the text is a short introduction to abilities of the Czech defence industry and answering the question if and how it is able to fulfil the demand of the Czech defence sector for an armament and a military gear. Basic items needed for a military capability of soldiers on a field and the ability to develop and produce them at the Czech territory is mainly examined.

It is a point at which attacking forces are unable to continue their attack or even defend themselves, because do casualties, shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations, and sheer physical exhaustion. This sequel article deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the culminating point operational concept. The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas and concepts described in his book "On War", doctrinal publications analysis and study projects of the operational art theorists. It treats conditions influencing achievement of the culminating point on single levels of war-strategic, operational and tactical and highlights coherences and factors having fundamental influences on culmination. The article is accompanied by several graphs describing this theory in detail. Key words: Culmination, Culminating Point, Zeroing, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Campaign Planning and Developing Operations.

This article begins with a theoretical discussion of the culminating point, for both the attack and defence. Key definitions and related concepts provided in Carl von Clausewitz's On War, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, are discussed in detail. These sources provide many of the factors that can cause a force to reach culmination, and serve as a basis for understanding the difficulties involved in trying to determine the time and place of culmination. Other current factors attributing to culmination are discussed, and recommendations are offered to help operational commanders and planners to zero in on this elusive point. It is of the utmost importance that one's own, and the enemy's culminating point be identified with the highest possible degree of accuracy during the planning phase of a major operation or campaign.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

In this article the author explores the potential roles for unmanned ground vehicles (tactical UGVs) in the modern battle space as pack mules, fighting scouts and perimeter sentries as new concepts of operation, designs and products emerge. Remote control vehicles could be also used in explosive ordnance disposal operations. Urban warfare looks set to become a particularly rich field for this sort of robots. The article discusses the challenges in developing and deploying cost-effective UGVs on the battlefield. There are still many problems, namely technological. The price for a UGV is comparable to price for four or five wheeled armoured vehicles. The article is based upon materials from RUSI Defence Systems (No. 2/2007), studies by Myron E. Mills, Kevin Ivison, James Masey. Ulf Stremmel; and Andy Simms: Robot Wars. Soldier, No. 12, 2007.

As the world grows ever more urbanized, the Air Force prepares airmen to fight in cities. They are complex domains where military operations are congested by terrain and by the danger of collateral damage and the risk to non-combatants. The Air Force supports the joint force by providing valuable airspace control, command and control, communications and psychological operations support, close-air support, terminal attack control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue. But Air Force capabilities in the urban are not just the supporting force for urban operations, it has ability to provide strategic attack against critical urban area. Based upon an article by Lt.Col. Brian M. Newberry in Armed Forces Journal, September 2006.

The purpose of this article is to explain methods of the application of artillery fire, according to the width and shape of targets by artillery regiment (without rocket battery) and by artillery battery, if components/data for effective fire are set by substitute means, without computer with respective SW. The assignment of optimal method of artillery fire and its professional implementation has a great influence on FFE (fire for effect). For the sake of economy, live firing practice is executed only to a limited extend. Most of activities are carried out only in the field of command skills, keeping documents, commanders' performance and training gun crews; their reactions to commands and orders. The article is accompanied by several tablets with data concerning application of artillery fire, variable data for aiming devices, adjusted ranges of fire, widths of target divided into several sheaves of fire (converge sheaf, sheaf for target width), their corrections.

Conventional military strategists did not hold counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare with high esteem. In fact, strategists often marginalized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discussions. But true strategic thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare consider time and space and long strategic view. Now we must consider critical areas for the global war on terrorism (GWOT), including changing nature of the threat environment. Sources: Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, by E. Cohen, Lt.Col. C. Crane, Lt.Col. J. Horvath, Lt.Col. J. Nagl; Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency by Col. J. B. Celeski in Military Review March-April 2006.

The main objective of the ACR is the most effective and best defence of the country, with the use of principles of collective defence. But the military activities are accompanied by damages, wastes in living environment. The classification of those effects is being done by the method called Hazard and Impact Index that enables to set probable damages in advance and to adopt preventive measures to prevent them. The process starts with evaluating objects that might be endanger, materials, vehicles, activities, energy, together with impact on environment. Impact groups are divided roughly into two groups: natural surrounding, and socio-cultural surrounding. Some are expected, other unexpected, frequently they are mixed. Most of military damages are unintended, accidental. The article is accompanied by the tables introducing figures of Hazard and Impact Index.

The article deals with duties of a sniper and a military observer, sharp shooting at long distances, movement at areas in which operations are being carried out. Snipers are trained marksmen who are specialized in sniping the enemy. They are usually sited away form the main force, so that they can concentrate on shooting at selected targets instead of being drawn into general firefight. They are also less likely to be affected when the main force comes under artillery fire. The modern sniper is not alone, he is usually employed in team of two. The author also describes rifles and other weapons and equipments snipers are armed. The article is supplemented by graphs and tablets.

The article deals with the question of unmanned aircraft generally, it doesn't discuss their individual types. Unmanned aircraft (UAVs) are designed to fly without a pilot (that is by remote control), their combat engagements are less risky and potentially less costly. Army officials say that UAVs will serve better, as they will carry more weapons and sturdier avionics, use the same fuel as other service aircraft, and could be operated by soldiers in theatre. Avionics and weapons might be controlled even by a conventional link with ground control stations. One "land pilot" can control several UAVs simultaneously. The running programmes will produce mature technologies and stable designs, making use of critical technologies, control abilities. The other critical technologies are: an engine that uses heavy fuel and an automatic take-off and landing system. As a part of coalition forces, the UAVs had proved their usefulness and serviceability in the Middle East.

The article deals with particularly topical problem, the riots with ethnic background. The present situation is compared with history illustrations and with similar recent events abroad. Author's reflections and scenarios outline a variant of state failure and its institutions, with the exception of army. He identifies respective incoming risks, among others tied with the so-called Roma question. Actually, his hypothetical solutions are not backed by the current laws of the Czech Republic. The author comes to the conclusion that army deployment might be used only as an instrument of last resort, "ultima ratio".

The basic purpose of this article is to introduce mentioned new military publication, recently compiled and prepared by the team of authors from the Czech Tradoc in Vyškov. This code should unify the practice within the ACR. It is not an internal normative rule (military manual), but it has validity of service document, under the authority of the Chief of Czech General Staff. In a way, it is the document of new generation, possessing doctrinal character. Principles explained in this publication are binding, but the ways of their application and usage depend solely on army commanders. The publication integrates, unifies and harmonizes military terminology in use, describe the preparation of units for foreign missions, military exercises and their evaluations (including respective documents), defines methods of planning namely at the level of company (battery), battalion (group), underlines significance of e-learning and so on.