Fulltext search in archive

This article presents the first systematic analysis of cognitive resilience education within the Czech Ministry of Defence, which is growing in importance in the context of contemporary hybrid threats. Through methodological triangulation (document analysis, questionnaires, interviews), the research maps the coverage of relevant topics across all levels of formal military education. The SWOT analysis reveals both existing foundations for cognitive resilience development and the absence of a systematic approach to this issue. The results highlight three main challenges for transforming the educational system: systematisation of the approach, personnel resources, and infrastructure modernisation. The study establishes an empirical basis for strategic recommendations to strengthen military personnel resilience against information and psychological operations.

The article describes an innovative view of a possible methodical process of access and protection against disinformation. The ever-increasing digitization and use of cyberspace to disseminate all kinds of data and information provides users with an indisputable number of associated benefits associated with rapid access, distribution or sharing of current knowledge. However, this development trend also reciprocally generates a number of related threats that need to be faced. Our own resilience and effective tools against information campaigns and information actions of all relevant actors play the key role here. The critical thinking itself and the process mechanisms used to access information are the focus of overall resilience to this type of security threats. Thus, the methodical process can help a wide range of readers broaden their view of the complexity of the problem and partially minimize the associated security risks.

This study deconstructs the concept of active measures through the prism of information influence. It understands it as sophisticated methods of influencing public opinion and political decisions, originally used by the Soviet Union and now adapted to cyberspace by the Russian Federation. In the analysis, the concept is contrasted with the general abstraction of information influence. This helps to better understand the proximity of active measures to similar concepts. We conclude that abstractions of information influence are also valid for conceptual understanding and practical examples of contemporary Russian active measures. Active measures are subsidiary to information influence, serving as tactical means to achieve the latter's strategic goals. Furthermore, the author states that the information environment is the operational theatre for active operations, cyber operations can be its manifestation, information operations support as a key component of a broader information operations strategy, and psychological operations are its critical element.

The article focuses on the concept of crowdsourcing in the social networking environment as a new phenomenon involving civilians in the intelligence process, enabling the use of their intelligence potential during armed conflict. Crowdsourcing of the civilian population is introduced by the example of NATO intervention during the first civil war in Libya. The article presents its use during the intelligence process at the strategic-operational level of command and control of the armed forces. It establishes its possible definition as a collection method of the intelligence process, and as a collection method which is disjunctively separable from similar intelligence collection methods.

The article presents selected functionalities of intelligence support in the Czech Armed Forces, which are addressed in the context of opportunities and challenges of the future operating environment. Its aim is to formulate, in parallel reflection with the current approaches of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the possibilities of implementing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and electromagnetic warfare in national conditions. Military practice is presented with a direction on how to respond to changes in the nature of the operational environment, including changes in the physical and non-physical domains of the battlespace to which all components of modern military forces must adapt while maintaining the necessary interoperability. The article is a response to differing and often not entirely correct understandings of the issue, which can be found even among specialists. It summarizes what has been learned so far and suggests where the discussed functionalities should go.

The concept of strategic communications rose to prominence especially with the events linked to the Crimea annexation and Russian intervention in Eastern Ukraine. As such it has been mostly related to the reactive fight against disinformation and propaganda or other elements of the hybrid campaign. This paper aims to point to the much broader potential for the tool of strategic communications in support of goals in the realm of national security and defence, while it is understood as proactive efforts and specific mindset using the information effect to advance national interests. Based on the literature review, benefits of strategic communications beyond hybrid campaigns are identified also in the fields of foreign military operations, counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, deterrence and crisis management. It describes the informational, particularly, the cognitive, dimensions of these security threats as well as of the measures to counter them.

Government expenditures allocated for defence are one of the categories comparable between countries to observe and analyse long-term trends. The paper compares the defence budgets of the USA and the Russian Federation between 2000 to 2019 with the aim to analyse potential causes of fluctuations in defence spending. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that military budgets are dependent on a combination of various factors such as current domestic policy, the economic cycle and global security and economic issues. The work uses significant as historical milestones to analyses their impacts on the dependent variable of military budget. As these, Operation Enduring Freedom (2001), Iraq war (2003), the inauguration of the US Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the economic crisis (2007-2008), the Russian currency crisis (2014) and the Russian annexation of Crimea (2014) were identified.

In the light of neorealist theory, the Eastern enlargement of NATO satisfies basic feature of expansion: 9 former countries of the Warsaw Pact become members of NATO. USA as a Sea power reinforced its superiority at the detriment of the RF as a continental power. The annexation of Crimea, as a Russian answer, had intensified security fears of post - Soviet countries and of Poland and enlarged the space for external balancing of the USA. Author warns that a confrontational structure had become typical for the area or the Western part of the Post - Soviet space. It increases the number of military incidents, and, even, the threat of a direct military confrontation including a Russian use of tactical nuclear arms, being inspired by the Rogers plan from 1980´s.

The article is based mostly upon an essay Composants et caractéristiques de la stratégie de désinformation by Gula Csurgai. published in Revue Militaire Suisse, March, April, 2007. Disinformation is the deliberate dissemination of false information. It may include the distribution of forged documents, manuscripts, and photographs, or propagation of malicious rumours and fabricated intelligence. In the context of espionage or military intelligence, it is the deliberate spreading of false information to mislead an enemy as to one's position or course of action. It also includes the distortion of true information in such a way as to render it useless. Disinformation is used for preparing public opinion before military operations are opened, the conflict must be "personalized" (the fight of Good against Evil), arousing emotions, sustaining ignorance and confusion, targeting information flows, omitting pieces of information and pushing redundant information. It is necessary to emphasize the role of used language. This phenomenon is described in the famous novel 1984 by George Orwell. The words are capable to arouse concrete images that consequently influence people's behaviour. Disinformation should not be confused with misinformation, which is not deliberate.

The article presents the theory of information operations on the background of contemporary armed conflicts in Ukraine, Iraq and Syria. In the introduction, information is presented as a phenomenon and the accelerator of social development. It outlines basic information channels that deliver security information to their recipients. Furthermore, the article discusses security and operational environment and also vulnerabilities being caused by increasing dependence on information. The core of the article are information operations presented in theory with the author's commentary on real application in military practice and in terms of the Czech Armed Forces. As part of information operations are subsequently introduced psychological operations, computer network operations and electronic warfare. The article ends with real examples of information and psychological operations in modern warfare, and conditions of their management in the Czech Armed Forces. The conclusion summarizes the general idea of the security environment and information operations, and stresses the importance of information operations in current and future conflicts.

The purpose of this article is to inform on elements of military deception in NATO armies and overarching principles that make military deception successful. Deception Planning is an iterative process that should be considered as an inextricable part of the operational planning. The knowledge in the field of military deception in the Czech military is low; no operational deception plan has been prepared for foreign operations or any military exercise. Deception is widely appreciated as a powerful instrument of military operations, yet it is surprisingly neglected by both the Czech Army and Military Educational System. The author tries to encourage officers and members of higher staffs to study this subject.

Infomantion era could be characterized as a period of steem qualitative and quantitative information raise, aroused namely by sharp development of information and comunication technologies (ICT) . Military deception thus acquires new dimensions, wider chances to be employed in armed forces operations. This article concludes a free series of essays dealing with military deceiving. It is thinking over questions resulting from deception-information age relations, the beginnig of which could be situated into the 80s last century.

In the previous Military Review we introduced the article "Will Military Deception Pass Away?" by the same author. In the Army of the Czech Republic we have no manual dealing with military deception (MILDEC). The only manual concerning MILDEC was abolished without any substitute. But military art can't be further developed without similar documents. Today we take MILDEC as a complex set of provisions misleading enemy's commanders and staff, by means of false information and counterfeit data that deliberately deceive adversary decision-makers and planners. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation also helps to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. The MILDEC could contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by many ways.

This article aims at building a bridge upon a gap, which separates academic sphere and intelligence community in the issue of predictive methodology. The author tries to accomplish this objective by presenting intelligence predictive methods based on open-source literature research. First, the question of uncertainty and probability in prediction is introduced (Cynefin template). Then follows basic introduction to predictive methods in civil and military intelligences, so that the reader might grasp the fundamentals of early warning systems. The academics and above all journalists should know the risks and perils in forming intelligence forecasts, estimates, foresight and warning scenarios, e.g. the so-called Black Swan scenario, the author explains potentials failures of the Delphi method. This study ought to be regarded as an introductory to predictive intelligence concurrently done by governmental agencies for purposes of national security and defence.

The article points out the altered role of intelligence and counterintelligence under the conditions of new security threats and relevant problems of intelligence analysis. Authors compare the theories of the orthodox and revisionist intelligence schools dealing with the detection of surprise attacks and finally outlines solutions related to the training of intelligence analytics. Orthodox views are as follows: surprising attacks are inevitable, such attacks will succeed as they are unpredictable, complex and sophisticated; reformists say that too much attention is paid to various failures, there are many cases in which intelligence prevention was successful. Threat analyses are very complicated; hints are not clear, ambiguous. New threats must be examined and eliminated with cooperation with other force branches, police, integrated rescue system, and others. Last but not least, there is indispensable role of preparation and schooling of intelligence officers.

This operation was led by Germany, and made up of elements contributed by twenty EU nations; as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The EU deployed FHQ in Kinshasa and simultaneously kept the over-the-horizon force in Gabon, in order to ensure a deterrent capacity and to avoid unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa. After Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR RD Congo was a second EU largest military operation, involving a total of almost 3,000 soldiers and officers). The co-operation with MONUC was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. The operation demonstrated the EU ability to successfully conduct medium scale autonomous multinational operations within a planned time frame under the UN mandate. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.