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This article aims at building a bridge upon a gap, which separates academic sphere and intelligence community in the issue of predictive methodology. The author tries to accomplish this objective by presenting intelligence predictive methods based on open-source literature research. First, the question of uncertainty and probability in prediction is introduced (Cynefin template). Then follows basic introduction to predictive methods in civil and military intelligences, so that the reader might grasp the fundamentals of early warning systems. The academics and above all journalists should know the risks and perils in forming intelligence forecasts, estimates, foresight and warning scenarios, e.g. the so-called Black Swan scenario, the author explains potentials failures of the Delphi method. This study ought to be regarded as an introductory to predictive intelligence concurrently done by governmental agencies for purposes of national security and defence.

This article contains main ideas from the essay by James J. Wirtz published in anthology Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, Frank Cass 2003. This theory is a unifying explanation of why states, for example, attempt to surprise their opponents with diplomatic or military initiatives. Surprise often is described as a force multiplier; something that increases the effectiveness of one's forces in combat. The prospect of surprise can prompt political leaders of the weaker side to believe that they can nullify that disparity and achieve their objectives. In other words, if strong parties began to view conflict from the weaker party's perspective, while weak actors kept war's dialectic in mind, then surprise would become less likely. The theory of surprise can identify when it is likely to occur, who is likely to find the element of surprise attractive as a basis of policy or strategy, and who is likely to be its victim. The trick now lies in making operational use of the theory of surprise.

Most adversaries of our western civilization recognize the information advantage and military superiority of the United States and Euroatlantic area. Rather than acquiesce to any potential Western military domination, they will try to circumvent or minimize US strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses. IT-driven globalization will significantly increase interaction among terrorists, narcotraffickers, weapons proliferators, and organized criminals, who in a networked world will have greater access to information, to technology, to finance, to sophisticated deception-and-denial techniques and to each other. Such asymmetric approaches-whether undertaken by states or nonstate actors-will become the dominant characteristic of most threats to both American homeland and Europe. They will be a challenge for our strategy, operations, force development, and they will require that strategy to maintain focus on traditional, low-technology threats as well as the capacity of potential adversaries to harness elements of proliferating advanced technologies. Among others, the author states 15 variations of plausible asymmetries.

This new generation war could be characterized by an emphasis on nonstate actors, by political and psychological forms of attacks that directly influence opponents. Other characteristics are as follows: extensive refugee flows, violence, transnational criminal aspects. Several factors will impact the nature, frequency and character of "small wars" in the 21st century. Failed/failing states, urbanization, diffusion of actors, communications technology, technological diffusion, religion, and ultra-terrorism. Clausewitz's fundamental appreciation for the primacy of political objectives as the guiding object in war remains relevant to "small wars" as does to interstate conflicts. The problem for today's strategist or policy maker is determining exactly what has changed, how the various means of stratecraft need to be adapted to the specific contingency at hand (according to The Journal of Strategic Studies, 6/2005).

The return of Russia as a power that begins again to partake in political agenda of present-day world raises the necessity to reflect its inner developments in the background of its recent history. There are six key factors that substantionally influence the position of Russia in the world: large sources of raw materials (pipelines); outstanding military capacities (the world's second nuclear potential); high level of general education; wide scientific and research base; permanent membership in UN Security Council and in the Group of Eight (G-8); deciding influence in the near neighbourhood. The study comes to the conclusion that Russia-in the horizon of 2020-will belong among world's leading actors, together with the US, the EU, China, and Islamic world. Russia will be able to of enforce its foreign and security goals, both in post-Soviet areas and in key regions in Europe, Asia and in the Great Near East. As such, it will probably get into conflict with the US. The priority tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will rest on maintaining nuclear parity with the US and building capacities for asymmetrical operations.