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This article illustrates the troubles encountered with development of the NRF. The NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special operations forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. The NRF is intended to be a transformational force that will not only be able to meet the security needs of NATO in 21st century but also serve as an agent of change whereby all the member nations of NATO will be able to bring capabilities, and concepts of operations into their national forces. Undoubtedly, the NRF will not provide a basis for solving all of complex challenges. But it does offer an opportunity for experimentation and testing-the essence of military transformation-and the forging of creative solutions. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of NATO or EU.

Factors such as distance, destination, deployment demands, duration, represent key elements to determine logistics requirements. The EU BG concept necessitates considerable strategic air/sea lift and combat support capabilities, since EU battle groups are to be able to be deployed almost anywhere in the world, primarily in Africa. They have to deploy both troops and materiel simultaneously to its mission areas. Strategic airlift is the fastest way of deploying troops over long distance. The main challenge for the EU is therefore availability giant airplanes. A lack of suitable European transport crafts in EBalabáuropean airlift fleet is the Achilles heel to the EU BG Concept. The problem is that all aircraft available have only limited payload capacities and flying range. Although deploying by sea is more time consuming than deploying by air, EU member states have more ships available for strategic sea transport. The strict deployment deadline set down in the EU BG Concept means that ships and crews will have to be held at very high readiness.

The Combined Joint Exercise was focused on the European approach to crisis management operations and involved an annual exchange of students and directing staffs between of the Higher Command and Staff Colleges from France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. The aim of this article is to provide knowledge and personal experience of its author based on his own participation in this exercise at the Escuela Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas (ESFAS) Madrid. The purpose of the exercise was to foster the understanding, mutual knowledge and dialogue among the offi cers of the aforementioned colleges through the practice of operational planning. Among general information describing the character of the exercise, the article defines some areas of the operational art, namely Operational Planning Process, Operational Design, Decisive Point Concept and Centre of Gravity Analysis.

The Command and Control process may be defined as an ability to determine what to do and implement effective actions. With the use of the Standard Operating Procedures, the commander must be able to realize set tasks in defined time. The C2 system must be able to monitor and collect data on the situation, to develop an understanding of the situation, to develop a course(s) of action and select one, to develop a plan to execute the selected course of action, to execute the plan, to include providing direction and leadership to subordinates, to monitor execution of the plan and adapt as necessary. The commander draws the picture of situation on the base of surveillance and data collection from various sources, classified and unclassified. The context of information is formed by means of paradigm of personal experiences of commander and his intuition.

This article covers the EUFOR RD Congo operation preparation phase and provides information on Military Strategic Planning Process, Military Operational Planning, Collaborative Planning, EU OHQ Potsdam activation and Force Generation Process. It describes planning period to highlight a pivotal role of training and education. Operation EUFOR RD CONGO was the EU second military intervention in the RDC, following Operation Artemis in 2003. The EUFOR RD CONGO mission was to support MONUC during running election process, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1671, authorizing the temporary deployment of an EU force in the RDC. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech MoD. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

This study is based on a paper presented at the conference with the same heading taking place on January 8, 2009. First, the authors enumerate starting points of Czech defence and security polity together with key factors influencing their developments. The whole scale of new threats-from WMD and ballistic proliferation to cyber attack and even non intentional threats like climate change and pandemia-are to be addressed not only in NATO but also in the EU. Existing states of affairs are gradually reflected by Czech security and defence documents: Security Strategy 1999, 2001, 2003; Military Strategy 1999, 2002, 2004, 2008. In this historical context we joined NATO defence alliance and took part in peacekeeping missions abroad. Previous twenty years when we lived in peace could be regarded as a challenge to build Czech statehood. There is no time like a present. Only the future will show us whether we mastered it as much as we could.

This operation was led by Germany, and made up of elements contributed by twenty EU nations; as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The EU deployed FHQ in Kinshasa and simultaneously kept the over-the-horizon force in Gabon, in order to ensure a deterrent capacity and to avoid unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa. After Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR RD Congo was a second EU largest military operation, involving a total of almost 3,000 soldiers and officers). The co-operation with MONUC was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. The operation demonstrated the EU ability to successfully conduct medium scale autonomous multinational operations within a planned time frame under the UN mandate. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The Czech Republic became involved in ISAF in 2002, among others we sent there both field hospital and field surgical team; later meteorological group, traffic control group with EOD team began to serve at the Kabul International Airport. In 2004, the 601st Special Force Group was engaged in Enduring Freedom operation, Czech soldiers served in German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), positive role was played by Czech Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team. Another successful mission was establishing PRT Logar, supporting social, economical development in this province. New common features of PRT, helicopter OMLT, EUPOL mission, partly SOG is the concentration on building Afghan capacities, namely ANSF (Afghan National Security Force) and public administration. Together with their deliberate support, it has multiplying effect, as assistance and training bring more effects than mere fulfilling standard military tasks, guarding e.g. Dutch base.

The article is focused on applications of the Reach-Back concept as a procedural help to the technical supervision of the investor during peacekeeping missions abroad. The fourth part of the article describes the technical supervision of the investor based on KFOR mission lesson learned. Private local construction companies perform the majority of constructional works during KFOR missions. In fact, with the use of Reach-Back concept, there is no difference between the contents of work of technical supervision of investor in peace time in the Czech Republic and during the mission in Kosovo. The Reach-Back concept has several applications, Lotus Sametime, Lotus Quickr iProject (CAD systems). All applications are opened to wide use via field engineering address, http://ipzv. unob.cz. Supervision in ACR Mission Abroad OPINIONS, CONTROVERSY

The article deals with the state of English e-learning on the premises of the University of Defence. The authoress introduces some pages of the electronic materials used for the General Staff Course as an example of modern methods of learning English. She explains the basic principles of the work with these exercises. There is also mentioned the military English interactive CD-Rom that was published last year and is used as the electronic support for learning military English; and also a new CD-Rom that is being developed now is mentioned because it will be used for the General Staff Course participants as well. Because of the fact that Czech military personnel are expected to serve in multinational operations, this interactive CD-Rom will make their language training easier. In the last part of the article, the opinions of the General Staff Course participants on using e-learning materials are given on the basis of questionnaires.

The so-called Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are a relatively new concept and element in coalition operations. Those teams have been operating in Afghanistan since the end of the year 2002. The evaluation and assessment of their work is very complicated and sometimes quite unambiguous. The main purpose of this article is to show to widest military community tasks and problems of PRTs; secondly to introduce main principles of work of PRTs under different conditions. Moreover, this article refers to fundamental problems that guide their PRTs development and work in countries that have some experiences with building and activities of PRTs. The author also describes the activities of 40 Czech military personnel PRT in Afghanistan (in the frame of German PRT, Badakshan Province, Fayzabad).

The reform of the Czech armed forces is factually and timely tied with the transformation of NATO forces, both in the field of technology and that of doctrine. The covering principle of this transformation is the so-called EBAO concept, in the frame of which we define three main transformation objectives: forces must have operational superiority, they must be operationally effective, deployable, and sustainable. The effects-based approach to operations focuses on combining military and non-military actions to influence the overall behaviour and capabilities of other actors: national, trans-national, belligerent and benign, in an operational environment in order do create effects leading to the achievement of strategic objectives and a desired end-state. Its application focuses the planning, execution and assessment of operations. The cited EBAO handbook was followed by several documents (e.g. discussion papers), issued at the end of 2007 as a means to inform future doctrine reviews. Many of the concepts and documents should be validated, either through experimentation, or through specifically designed exercises.

This article deals with the present state of command and control dilemma in brigade battle groups. It outlines the resources of the rationalization of organizational structures at HQs and it shows their impact on modular design of the command posts. The gradual introduction of NATO Network Enabled Capability (NEC) into Czech armed forces (Bde TF-Brigade Task Force), requires first, changes in the structure of individual components of command and control system; secondly, initiating basic changes oriented towards optimalization command and control structures; third, the preparation of commanders and staffs in the field of information technology, so that they could achieve knowledge and control dominance. At the same time organizational changes raise modification within command chains of separate groups.

At present, artillery problems are rather neglected. Artillery brigade, which consists of two arty battalions, can form two division task forces, up to two brigade task forces, or several battalion task forces. This presupposes establishing unified chain of command points. At present, we may form three main command points of division, brigade and battalion task force. The author depicts tasks and missions of individual levels of task forces, their composition, main elements of command and control. Special attention is paid to centres of combat support, or places of combat support at battalion level. At present, commanders of combat units do not use fully potential of artillery support. Therefore it is necessary to discuss those problems, so that our artillery could be used in most efficient way. The article is accompanied by several charts and pictures, showing schemes and tasks of artillery forces and standardized operational procedures.