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This article presents not only an non-conventional approach towards psychology of military groups, but also offers the deep insight into British way of military thinking. This article is concerned with cohesion in its broadest sense. The term cohesion is usually used to describe one of the many contributions to morale. British military doctrine says that manoeuvres approach is an approach to operation in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. The cohesion in this context is being used to describe the complex interaction of the physical, moral and conceptual components of fighting. A thorough understanding of the cohesion between people would enhance their fighting power. The good leadership is the means by which an understanding of what enables cohesion can be used to bring it about. Source: Human Cohesion; Shock and Surprise on the Battlefield (D. Rowland, D. Roney, J. Storr), British Army Review No 137, 2005.

After the communist coup détat in 1948, although formally independent, the Czechoslovak army was subordinated under the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Following the year 1960, its inner life was directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), in fact by the Military Commission, headed by the First Secretary KSČ. Overall militarization of Czech society was even higher than e.g. in Poland, because in case of military conflict, our territory was supposed to play the role of main European theatre of war. In time of the so-called reform movement in the late 60's, there were some trends to release close ties with the Soviet Union, but at the same time the leading political and military authorities tried to place Soviet forces in Czech territory to strengthen Russian position in arms reduction talks with the US, so that the Soviet Union could boost its units at the borders with People's China. The author compares those events with the recent ones, after November 1989, and following processes of introducing civil control in the forces, their reduction, transformation, and professionalization. He quotes names and works of authors occupied with this theme.

The primary aim of the method Hazard & Impact Index (H&I Index) is to enable the commander to evaluate possible negative impacts of military exercise on environment, and quickly and in an operative way interpret whether intended military activities can be a threat to the conditions or surroundings, in which the units are employed. The authors propose several tables for the comparison of environmental groups (soils, forests, climates) with forces movements. The method still undergoes the development. The evaluated numbers are set only for a mechanized company of the Army of the Czech Republic in our local surrounding. But in the near future the authors predict its extension to all organic units of NATO stationed in European continent. The article is a sequel to the article by the same authors in Vojenské rozhledy, No 1 /2006.

In today's conflicts, such as the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat is more difficult to define; in fact, there are often multiple threats working against our forces concurrently. Our army lacks first-hand information from current battlefields, so that the author must make use of mediated experiences. The paper is therefore based upon articles from foreign military magazines, namely Intelligence Synchronization on a Nonlinear Battlefield (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 4/2004) and Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operation (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1/1997). It is not a mere translation or compilation, but ingenious summing up of discussed ideas. In this study, the author thinks over intelligence synchronization and proposes a new way of looking at it. Methodology heads from priority intelligence requirements towards specific information requirements, via indicators, and so on. The purpose of intelligence synchronization is to focus efforts to build, refine, or clarify the commander's understanding of the battlefield and the threat.

Even after the Cold War, our world is full of local and international conflicts. There were dozens of wars, fringe clashes between local opposing groups in Africa, Asia and so on. Among them there were four wars of lager size, with more than thousands of deaths in each of them that could be characterized as international wars: Desert Storm 1991, Iraqi Freedom 2003, Allied Strength 1999, and Enduring Freedom 2001. Now we can look at them from a distance ...217 Problems tied with those large-scale wars have several levels: supranational (international) level and military level, being accompanied by paradoxes: international and political paradoxes and military ones. This influenced structures and methods of training and preparation of Australian, Britain and US forces. The lessons were embedded into their military concepts, rules and regulations, e.g. Complex Warfighting (Australia), Future Land Operating Concept (UK), Field Manual: Interim Counterinsurgency Operations (US). New roles of military forces, global and local implications, ought to be embedded also into the structures and concepts of the Army of the Czech Republic, concludes the author.

Using the example of medium-term planning of development and activities of defence department, the article demonstrates one of possible ways of using the so-called 3E methods. The Czech def inition of 3E is based upon the Act on Financial Control, Control of Public Expenditures, Regulation ISO 9001-2001, and Methodical Instruction MF CR (CHJ- 10). The author compares them with e.g. Financial Management Policy Manual JSP 462, MoD, London, UK.

The main theme of this extensive paper is ethical evaluation of the state of affairs in Iraq that would play greater role - directly or indirectly - in the decision-making of foremost politicians, more role then we might think. Although the author quotes various positive or negative attitudes towards the war, he does not intend to prove or refute presented theses. He broadly treats e.g. the so-called just-war, events when imminent threat might be a case for war, moral clarity in a time of war, situations when we consider that our aims might be achieved by peaceful means. Last but not least, he writes about attitudes of church leaders, the Holy See, lines of their reasoning. The armed forces are called upon to do their duty. The greater the threat, the grater is the risk of inaction, the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory actions. In such case, the governments make their final decisions. It is not the responsibility of church-leaders or military commanders. To obey it, it would not be in conflict with the churches teaching. In these circumstances, the troops could regard an order to go to battle as morally decent, in pursuit of a moral good purpose.