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Thisarticledeals withanalysis ofthemagazineDabiq.Thismagazineis published by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and it serves to Jihadist propaganda in English language. The content analysis is used. Thematic fields (with qualitative analysis) and important terms (with term freqency analysis). Authors identified tree main themes of the Dabiq magazine - religion, establishing of the Caliphate and its functions and military operations of the ISIS. The conceptualization of the enemies from the point of view of the ISIS.

The article brings outcomes from the critical analysis of interaction between planning by objectives and capability planning. The analysis is based on the assumption that the strategic decision-making process should be assisted by a systemic tool, enabling a financial assessment of capabilities, identified as a prerequisite for accomplishing politico-military ambitions. Taking into account the current planning system, as implemented within the Ministry of Defence, the planning by objectives might become this tool. However, for providing an efficient planning by objectives, it is necessary to derive relevant findings from the capability planning, which basically includes data on capability assessment, identified capability shortfalls and their prioritisation. Therefore, findings from capability planning process are a keystone for conceiving objectives for the area of capability development. Both capability planning and planning by objectives are to be seen as communicating conveyances, where a level of mutual interactions significantly influences effectiveness of defence performance management.
The analysis is aimed at identification and description of discrepancies hampering an efficient interconnection between planning by objectives and capability planning and, as a conclusion, the analysis proposes a definition of the core problem which causes respective discrepancies.

He graduated from Political and Social University and the Philosophical Faculty, Charles University Prague. From 1950 till 1970 he served in the army, he became a member of editorial staff of military magazine A-revue. After the invasion of Warsaw Pact to the former Czechoslovakia, he was separated from the Army. First, he worked as a storeman, later as an instructor in the Central House of Pioneers and Youth. After 1990 he was legally rehabilitated, promoted to the rank of retired colonel and became an advisor to Deputy Defence Minister for Social and Humanitarian Affairs. At this time he laid down foundation of Military Chaplaincy in the Army of the Czech Republic. After leaving defence department, he became a pedagogue at the Catholic Theological Faculty and cooperated with the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University.

When planning and conducting tactical exercises of units and formations, it is often the case that aspects of long-term operations in a chemical, biological or radiological contaminated environments have disappeared from consideration of commanders and staff officers. The reluktance to "complicate the situation" in training may have different causes, but the continuing importance of CBRN defence is indisputable. The article discusses probable commander questions related to the effective management of subordinate units in a contaminated environments. Their answering can help to successfully fulfill defined combat tasks that have been disrupted by the use of enemy weapons of mass destruction, improvised devices containing highly toxic substances, or leakage of industrial hazardous substances into the environment.

The aim of the article is to bring out results of the comparative analysis of NATO and EU defence planning processes. The comparative analysis was focused on identification of those findings which are identical for both NATO and the EU and which might be also beneficial for optimising the national defence planning process within the Czech Ministry of Defence. From this perspective, the key analysis outcome is identification of similar phases which were found out while comparing respective NATO´s and EU´s planning tools, i.e. J-DARTS and SAEP Process. Even if NATO and the EU are using a different terminology and different approaches to achieve expected results, the substance of respective phases is almost identical. A course of action how to implement the analysis outcomes into the national defence planning process might be the subject of a follow on research.

This article describes the basic terms used in prognostics (future studies, forecasting the future, prognosis, prediction, expert) and introduces selected prognostic methods and techniques which could be applied in security area (brainstorming, focus group, trend extrapolation, Delphi method, scenarios etc.). The basic classifications and prognosis typologies are mentioned as well. Particular phases of prognosis making are described too. For the Czech security community the prognosis making has an important potential whose outcomes (of particular surveys) should be manifest in following years. This text has only tried to outline selected methods and techniques for their potential application.

The document "Security and Stabilization: the Military Contribution UK revision of Joint COIN doctrine" was created by the team of authors of DCDC (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre), Defence Ministry, Great Britain. The publication was similarly as other JDP series written as an instruction manual for members of armed forces to solve at general level the tasks in missions abroad, in disintegrated countries: security, stabilisation and insecurity, strengthening the capacity within armed forces to work alongside civilians for certain specific, short-term reconstruction, development tasks in hostile environments, and to provide a stabilisation presence in the immediate aftermath of a military operation while sufficient security is put in place to enable civilians to deploy. It is highly recommendable literature for members at the level of join staffs, participants in stabilization operations, or for attenders of Higher General Staff Courses.

The paper deals with the concept of proxy wars in the region of the Middle-East and the role of intelligence services in it. In the current conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, many external actors and powers interfere using (not only) their intelligence services for the defence of their national interests in afflicted states, often even combating each other on a territory of a different state. The main goal of the paper is to introduce the concept of proxy war and analyse the role of intelligence services in the ongoing conflicts in the defined area.

Although the EU global security strategy has to offer orientation on multiple levels and domains, the present paper approaches the challenges emerging from the Union's eastern neighbourhood. The argumentation includes theoretical aspects of strategy, main characteristics of the Black Sea security environment, trends of frozen conflict evolution, and the EU's approach in this entire context. The study concludes that the serious challenges the EU faces nowadays in its eastern vicinity are the result of phenomena with a consistent history and deficient management by the EU. In our opinion, this train of events¨makes the project of a new EU security strategy so challenging that it could become a new document of an over-general character, with little practical value.

The term "hybrid war" is frequently used today within the military community, but the term does not bring something new in the view of the terminology of the stability operations, comprehensive approach or compound wars. This concept is based on the destructive threats to the military components of international community. It does not help in delimiting reasons of violent confl ict and from that point it is harmful, as it does not explain soldiers why they are fi ghting the "just war", why they should sacrifi ce their lives in confl icts far away from their homeland. We should not use terms of hybrid wars, hybrid confl icts, hybrid enemies or forces. Only "hybrid warfare" could find some legitimacy, but only when used with the correct definition of the conflict typology, backed by the political objectives of the war. Confl icts typology, as used, forms the framework for the mission analysis orientation at all command & control levels and it guides the informational support to the military decision making processes.

The NATO common funding has already been used to finance common needs of the Alliance for 65 years and has contributed substantially to its readiness, cohesion and solidarity. A number of reform measures have been approved, and in most cases already implemented, over the period of last several years with the aim of more effective, economical, efficient a transparent use of NATO common funds and the introduction of modern financial management practices. NATO common funding is therefore a live and well-functioning system. Nevertheless, there is still a room for further improvements. The aim of this article is to describe the role of NATO common funding, its basic parameters and tools, its development in the past, and current and future challenges.

The article is aimed on the identification of the tools of the international security organisations (NATO, European Union, Organisation for security and Cooperation in Europe) for de-escalation and resolution of the violent conflict in Ukraine. It is based on the liberal institucionalism. It characterizes and systematises tools and divides it into "soft power" and "hard power" tools. It is analysed the possibility of the use of armed forces as a coercive tool or in peacekeeping or monitoring missions. The NATO and the EU became involved in coercive diplomacy, the OSCE as a "soft power" becomes involved in mediation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and dispatched long time missions. All three analysed organisations used the tools without placing of armed forces.

The new ten-year defence strategy of the Czech Republic has been approved. The document stresses that despite the continuing recession, our state should not allow the military being weakened by further reduction of resources. This could worsen the quality of the military and weaken the Czech Republic's credibility in the international community. There is also the risk of the financial, organisational and personnel destabilisation of the Czech defence system that would bring about a loss of the quality of military personnel, a decayed prestige of the military service, an erosion of the state military capabilities. The new defence strategy is not a cure-all medicine. By its adoption the real

The proponents of Revolution in Military Affairs claim that modern military technology will lift a "fog of war". In this article the term "fog of war" is described and illustrated in a work of Carl von Clausewitz who is supposed to introduce this term, used also in the famous novel War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. These classics show us that uncertainty and chance, in other words fogs of war, are essential to human mentality. They will be present as long as war remains within a scope human endeavour. Emphasizing that military technology is equal to lifting the "fog of war" can lead to situation in which only trained commanders are supposed be able perfectly address problems in "chessboard" of war or computer simulators, but they will unable to manage a real world full of chaos, as they not used to count with uncertainties.

This article illustrates the troubles encountered with development of the NRF. The NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special operations forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. The NRF is intended to be a transformational force that will not only be able to meet the security needs of NATO in 21st century but also serve as an agent of change whereby all the member nations of NATO will be able to bring capabilities, and concepts of operations into their national forces. Undoubtedly, the NRF will not provide a basis for solving all of complex challenges. But it does offer an opportunity for experimentation and testing-the essence of military transformation-and the forging of creative solutions. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of NATO or EU.

Since the 1st release of an internal ministerial norm guiding planning processes of activities and development within the Czech Ministry of Defence (MOD) presuming existence of Capability Planning Methodology, this document has not been established. This article offers selected theoretical starting points and, on their basis, it outlines possible a ministerial process tree focused on the capability process as a ground for its definition within Czech MOD conditions. Further in a framework of an added value model proposes possible internal structure of above mentioned process down to sub-processes level with justification of their purpose and mutual links. Formulating mentioned attributes of the capability planning process this article makes a contribution to set up this process within the Czech MOD.

The paper offers new looks at the system of railroad reconstruction in crisis and emergency situations. It originates from The Operational Plan of State Territory Preparation that is implemented in harmony with The Plan of Technology Protection of Railroad. This article is a free sequel to information published in this Military Revue No. 4/2005 dealing with drafting the plan of railroad technology protection. The authors´ main purpose is to give readers basic knowledge on key changes in railroad security system and main security measurements till 2013. The protection system is intended to be more flexible and economic.

Light Infantry units are primarily equipped with the Iveco light armored vehicles in the Army of the Czech Republic. Similar type of vehicles was acquired by the armies of some other NATO members. Armored LMVs represent a new category of equipment and no specific tactical procedures have yet been created. The aim of the text was to develop general tactical light infantry procedures for the current training needs of units with Iveco LMVs. In the text, combat battle drills on vehicles and tactical procedures for the use of light units equipped with the LMV Iveco have been created. Combat deployment experience and results of live simulation were main source of information for development of LMV tactics and procedures. Presented procedures can be used for training of units equipped with LMV Iveco. The use of light armored vehicles also showed the design limits of this technique. LMVs Iveco cannot fulfill the role of primary vehicle of light infantry units on a conventional battlefield mainly due to their low level of endurance.

This article analyzes strategic engagement of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in the South Caucasus in four phases of development from the end of the Cold War until present day. The first phase covers early nineties, the second is from mid-nineties to 2003, the third from 2004 to 2008 and the fourth from 2009 to 2016/2017. There are three key trends during the examined period. First, Russia has permanent strategic interests in the South Caucasus due to maintaining its own state security and securing the position of the most prominent external actor in the region. Second, Russia's weakness and active engagement of the US/NATO are barriers to realizing Russia's state interests. Third, the South Caucasus is strategically more significant to Russia than the US/NATO.

The most frequently used methods during strategic documents processing at the Ministry of Defence are group discussion, brainstorming, discussion and analysis of stakeholders. SWOT analysis and other methods are represented in less than a fifth of cases. The research results show that some methods are used in methodologically wrong way, meanwhile, the most common method used is intuition based on experience. Implementation of strategic analysis usually encounters at the Ministry of Defence a lot of barriers. The article describes the results of research in this area and presents some recommendations for improvement, particularly synergistic use of methods called multi-methodology.

The Engineers are specialist soldiers trained in the construction and demolition of bridges, field fortifications, obstacles, roads, etc. Their major task is to support Czech missions abroad, as a part of multinational peacekeeping forces. This article is a preliminary study into the current state of applying the Czech Engineer units in operations other than war as a part of Joint Forces Peace Support Operations. There are mentioned some aspects, for example basic engineer support tasks, possible demanded future capabilities of the Czech Engineer Troops, engineer support to movement and force protection engineering. The purpose of this article is to initiate a debate about the topic and to start the brainstorming process in a broad military environment.

The article deals with persistent problems of Czech military policy within 1993-2009, its achievements and failures. A new managerial concept, system planning, programming and budgeting, which superseded a communist central control, was not implemented fully because of governance instability. The office of Defence Minister was held by 11 persons within 1993-2009 (Czech Republic). Among others, it aroused the return of a concept of central planning in 2004, which was not successful, because it was not supported by institutions outside the MoD. The authors propose more transparency in military matters and better cooperation with academic community to prevent the repetition of concepts supporting short-term goals instead of long-term visions.

Even though we have several concept documents: Security Strategy, Defence Policy, our armed forces are fragmentized by doubtful laws into autonomous sections, Army of the Czech Republic, Castle Guard, Military Office of the President, Military Intelligence. We lack a binding political assignment on defence policy. The Defence White Book was a serious attempt to introduce this problem among members of government, parliament. But it was ineffectual. The officials did not respond, contented with emergency arrangements. Alarms bell. Supposing the politicians are not involved in defence policy, we should lose our Alliance credibility, later on even Alliance collective security.

The development of C2 theory and practice within force requires an interdisciplinary approach. Commanding army needs not only the familiarity with armed forces and warfare principles, but also the knowledge and understanding of the development of security and operational environments. It is the development of security and operational environments that directly affects the theoretical and doctrinal thinking, the approaches to armed forces employment to deal with contemporary and future crisis situations. This paper is an attempt to project some opinions on C2 issues from the sixties last century to the present. As there are two periods with dozens of common characteristics, we can find a number of similarities. This article aims to point them out.

The consequences of economic recession and their impact on national defence budgets can indeed heavily hamper the credibility of both NATO and the EU. A need for coping with budget restrictions and ongoing security crisis in the Ukraine re-opens the issue of common European armed forces as an effective tool for keeping security stability not only in Europe, but also around the world. However, the key issue is to what extent it is feasible to develop autonomous European armed forces operating independently of transatlantic allies, while there is a very strong NATO-EU interconnection in the area of military capability development.

The paper presents reflections over the issue of armed forces capabilities. It is a phenomenon much discussed and written earlier, namely from the point of its building, estimation and development. Nevertheless the question is whether practical experiences are backed by theory fundamentals. Now we have a chance to introduce the live theory of quality management [1] into this specific and frequented military problem. The article is a polemic consideration over possibilities of introducing capabilities management into command and control capabilities system in armed forces.

Respecting rules of international laws is indispensable to guarantee a peace balance among forces of all states. It ought to be in their own interest. By and large, the flagrant breaking of those rules and acts of aggression correspond directly to the military power of individual states. Examples are abundant. This essay deals with the definition of aggression that was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1974.

The article deals with aspects of operational art inside the operations planning process. It deals with the concepts of operational design and suggests a possible way of introducing such theory into the development process of operational approach. This paper is a free sequel to several articles published in Military Review on this theme. It introduces several professional terms in the field of operational art, up to now not officially established.