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At the time of forming the team around a designated defence minister Alexander Vondra, in the early summer 2010, there was no doubt that we need a complex concept document, able to analyze and describe the then situation, to readjust directions and goals for defence department, so that it could stimulate the follow-up transformation of Czech Army. The author, who used to be one of the leading Defence Ministry officials, thus made use of his experiences he gained in NATO structures. He gives an apt, well-founded, and first hand description of key points of this very fresh military history.

The paper presents reflections over the issue of armed forces capabilities. It is a phenomenon much discussed and written earlier, namely from the point of its building, estimation and development. Nevertheless the question is whether practical experiences are backed by theory fundamentals. Now we have a chance to introduce the live theory of quality management [1] into this specific and frequented military problem. The article is a polemic consideration over possibilities of introducing capabilities management into command and control capabilities system in armed forces.

The control of emergency economic measures, namely state material reserves, is an important part of Czech security system. From the institutional point of view, all is run under the authority of a central institution-the Administration of State Material Reserves (ASMR). This paper deals with its role in the management of state material reserves, reflects problems and consequences resulting from the changes in security surrounding, re-evaluates opinions and views both by experts of state administrations and academic community. Those are the main key questions the study seeks an answer.

There exists a variety of deployment strategies, visions and concepts for armed forces, how they will operate in the future horizon. The key part of operational concepts consists of several key characteristics, which include e.g. the account of military problem, its military solution describing in broad terms how military forces will operate across the wide range of military operations in pursuit of strategic objectives and thereby consequent requirements for military capabilities development. The article does not provide a comprehensive answer to all the problems associated with the concept development. Rather, its purpose is to point out some aforementioned aspects crucial not only for operational concepts developers, responsible individuals and organizations, but it may be beneficial even for commanders in terms of their operational thinking and drafting an appropriate operational approach to solving day-to-day acitivities.

Our new stance to comprehensive control of security in the international context is based upon the so-called "wider security concept". Despite various definitions,there is the consensus that a national state is not the only security subject, the classical paradigm was extended to other areas, outside military one: political, economy, financial, banking, environmental, and social. They are endorsed by security problems related to technology, energy, raw material sources, ethnical disputes, religion, together with humane rights and cultural aspects. To win the war is easy, to establish peace is difficult. Last but not least, we now have to fight and win the war of public opinion.

The article is involved in the problems of providing humanitarian aid. The authors analyze legislative and social surroundings upon which the humanitarian assistance is rendered by the Army of the Czech Republic. They characterize various forms of non-governmental organizations in our country and the conditions under which the Czech Army is allowed to cooperate with them. There are many special features in providing assistance, namely as far as members of various church denominations in the Czech Republic are concerned. The list of selected denominations with their short profiles is enclosed.

The article is a polemic reflection over the potential concept and vision of defence and EU combined armed forces, from the military point of view. It recalls previous efforts and present activities to implement common security and defence policy in practice. It is a short analysis of conditions under which the EU is situated, and in general contours it characterizes possible advantages of common European armed forces. It expresses author's opinion that by forming "European Pillar" in NATO, the transatlantic linkage between the EU and the USA will not be weakening, but on the contrary, it will be strengthen. The author uses the terms "European army" and "common armed forces of EU" that he takes as synonyms and therefore he asks the reader to take this fact in account.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

This article deals with the EU command and control functions and provides basic information on the structure and capabilities of the EU CCS in Battle Group EU operations. The author describes political and strategical levels CCS (COREPER, GAERC, COPS, CivCom, EUMC, EUMS, BDE HQ, prospective EU FHQ). Only US, EU and E3 (Britain, France, Germany) are capable to realize integrated expeditional operations. The ACR can work only with cooperation with them. The Czech Republic as a small EU member state is actively engaged in the building of the Battle Group EU. The Czech Army is going to increase its expeditionary capabilities as demanded and be prepared for a broader range of conflicts and crises in the vital area of the EU concerns. At present, the ACR is able to carry out a self-supported, integrated expedition operation only on the edge of all its strength. The political leaders must bear this fact in mind, as the army mustn't be overburdened, otherwise it might lose its credibility. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

It is a point at which attacking forces are unable to continue their attack or even defend themselves, because do casualties, shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations, and sheer physical exhaustion. This sequel article deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the culminating point operational concept. The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas and concepts described in his book "On War", doctrinal publications analysis and study projects of the operational art theorists. It treats conditions influencing achievement of the culminating point on single levels of war-strategic, operational and tactical and highlights coherences and factors having fundamental influences on culmination. The article is accompanied by several graphs describing this theory in detail. Key words: Culmination, Culminating Point, Zeroing, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Campaign Planning and Developing Operations.

The article deals with the evaluation of military expenditures of European Union's four selected countries in the period of 2001-2008. Among examined countries belong the Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia. The term military expenditures is used by many users, so the article defines first this term and also sources from which the authoress collected data for evaluation. The main source of statistical data about military expenditures is the Stockholm international institute, namely its research yearbooks.

The defence environment is complex and dynamic. This is a result of the nature of modern conflict, rapid changes in technology, the need to deal with uncertainty in the face of limited sources, changed attitudes to risk and the sheer diversity of actors from different cultural backgrounds. Defence-decision makers are confronted with an increasing operational complexity that has strategic implications. Decisions on defence policy and strategy are characterized by uncertainty and risks. This Article describes differences in Hard and Soft Operational Analyses, and presents some examples and conclusions for military practice.

Operational art is the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. This article is a sequel to the study published in a previous issue of this Military Revue. The author discusses the fundamental pillars of operational art, upon which Alliance countries build their doctrinal and defence documents concerning operational art. A separate section deals with conditions and status of operational art in the Army of the Czech Republic in the last 20 years. The author calls for the need to introduce operational art in several key areas of Czech doctrines. He recalls the necessity to implement those issues in the prepared Doctrine of the ACR.

From research reports cited in this article, the period of six months seems to be suitable time for the deployment abroad. A soldier should not be redeployed for at least one year, following his previous mission. The majority of soldiers cope with deployments well and without any psychopathology. Most reported mental problems are alcohol misuse, followed by posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and by the depression. Alcohol seems be even the higher risk for soldiers less exposed to combat stressors (e.g. fire), but more to chronic stressors (boredom, isolation, helplessness) than PTSD for a soldier in action. Therefore pre-deployment training of our soldiers should be more devoted to mental health aspects, starting with alcohol overuse.

The aim of the article is to provide the readers information related to the theory of fundamental elements and tools of operational art, which are for the preparation and conduct of military operations, particularly at the operational level of war, critical. The operational level of war depends on methods that will create appropriate conditions to achieve the closing state, set by a superior commander, in accordance with the complex strategy of military and non-military instruments of state power. Although the methods of application of specific operational art components rest mainly in the mind of the English Annotations and with several acts tied with civil emergency preparation.

The new ten-year defence strategy of the Czech Republic has been approved. The document stresses that despite the continuing recession, our state should not allow the military being weakened by further reduction of resources. This could worsen the quality of the military and weaken the Czech Republic's credibility in the international community. There is also the risk of the financial, organisational and personnel destabilisation of the Czech defence system that would bring about a loss of the quality of military personnel, a decayed prestige of the military service, an erosion of the state military capabilities. The new defence strategy is not a cure-all medicine. By its adoption the real

In conclusion of article in Military Review No 3, 2011, the authors gave notice about a sequel to this article. Today they describe military deception form another point of vies. They depict the creation of false picture, deception in the frame of operational planning. The authors accentuate that not only Asian countries, but also western ones look back to classical works on military art, e.g. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (around 2,000 years ago). Sun Tzu's philosophy recommended a strategic method to win that rarely required actual war. Spies, diplomats, deception, and a correctly organised internal structure were his main tools. If it came to war, he recommended among others to use detailed and elaborated military deception.

This year, the Hlávka Economy Institute published a book "Professional Army in the Czech Republic: First Five Years", by Bohuslav Pernica. It is a study dealing with first five years in which the Czech Republic transformed its forces from a conscription army to all-volunteer one. The author sees the necessity to go professional in context of changed global surrounding after the end of Cold War. The subject is treated mainly from economy point of view. He pays attention to three important issues related to this transformation: recruitment /retention, training /education, and substandard soldier's pay, which is one of roots of low service competitiveness on civil labour market.

In our country, existing strategical documents related to security used to be compiled very carefully, but proved to be not very effective, as they did not fit to practical everyday security policy, they did not comply with day-to-day requirements. The only exception was the 1991 doctrine dealing with the creation of Integrated Rescue System and the implementation of professional armed forces. At present, there is a tendency to rewrite those strategy documents again, namely in the field of security. The preparation of a new version of Czech security strategy is taking place in time marked with new trends in world politics and economy. The main attention is attracted by crisis management, arms control, disarmament, WMD non-proliferation, cooperation with non-NATO nations, and international organizations, last but not least counterterrorism and cyberspace security strategy. In short the study mentions Czech political-military ambitions, defence strategy, defence capacity and resources, it appreciates in value knowledge gained by the Centre of Security Policy, Faculty of Social Science, Charles University Prague, and it contains conclusions and recommendations for the preparation the 2011 Czech National Security Strategy.

The objective of this article is to analyse the security and foreign policy of the Russian Federation in 2008-2012, in terms of security culture. The article is based on the assumption that the Russian security and foreign policy during Medvedev's presidency was characterized by four features: promoting multilateralism, exaggeration Russian national security threats, emphasizing the possibility of the use of nuclear deterrence, and using energy as a political tool. The article is based on three Russian strategic documents, i.e. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. It also examines some events of Russian internal and external policy, especially Russian-Georgian conflict, Medvedev's proposal to create new security architecture in Europe, or the security relations between Russia and the EU, NATO and the U.S.

This paper deals with theoretical and practical correlations of "additional" savings in defence sector. Referring to conclusions of White Paper of Defence, the author differencites between rational savings and irrational ones, i.e. the false savings. Rational savings lead us to higher economy, effecitivy and usefulness. Irrational savings present non-system measures when respective "cuts" are only for for appearance's sake, the savings are only for show. In reality, in terms of long-term prospects they will bring even higher social expenditures before those "cuts" were introduced. The author proposes several recommendations concerning effective saving to eliminate wasting defence sources.

On May 15, 2012, the Czech Defence Minister decided to establish the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies. The institution of this type has been long awaited, with great expectations. The author, director of this institute, presents the survey of similar scholarly institutions founded and finally cancelled in this country after 1989. This article introduces the original intent of its founders, namely Centre's future role in the development of strategic studies as a starting point for strategic management, its place in the system of Czech military education and training. The results reached by this institute ought to be truly utilized by MoD leaders and government officials.

The material for his paper the author draws on his experience from work in Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Department. In light of historical consequences, the article briefly describes the development of mobile sets for geospatial support. The main focus was paid to currently used stations SOUMOP (O) and SGEOB. He also mentions presently developed prototype GeMoZ-C. The author would like to familiarise our reading public with activities of Czech Army Geographic Service, its tools and devices in use.

One of most discussed themes in this field is also a critique of unfinished, non-stable structure of master documents, e.g. Security Strategy of the Czech Republic. They are often told to be obsolete. The latest document, the White Paper on Defence, Critical responses are not quite justified. There are a lot of good ideas, innovations. Many things have been done, many set tasks have been met at the level of Defence Ministry. Positive effects of results reached are obvious. They are summarized in the White Paper mentioned above. The only danger lies in arbitrary decisions by political management, including employing variable means of their implementation, wanton interpretation of leading defence principles, low respect to approved strategical decisions. We must name mentioned handicaps as a first step towards the real and true remedy.

This extended essay is based upon various sources, among others on May 2010 President Obama's speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where President Obama described his national security objectives. The highest priorities of U.S. national security are the safety of Americans at home and abroad and achieving a peaceful, stable world through global cooperation despite a flawed international system. The Obama's security strategy relies heavily on diplomacy and engagement, economic development and other methods of influence, along with U.S. military capabilities with global reach and unsurpassed resources. As we face multiple threats, from nations, non-state actors and failed states, America will maintain the military superiority that has secured country, and underpinned global security, for decades. The security strategy is global, and identifies an array of real or potential security challenges that include: countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials, resolving and preventing conflict; and reducing destabilizing risks to economic interdependence.

In our country we can meet various publications on intelligence activities, nevertheless we feel the lack of expert books with wider overreach. Among those publications that fulfil such demands belongs the work by Ladislav Pokorný "Secret Agencies", Prague: Auditorium, 2012. The book covers intelligence organizations of all kinds, including military ones. In military section the reviewer cites the famous ironic sentence "Under the Czech Law, we have three intelligence services, in fact there are four of them, with five directors". The publication is of high information value and could also serve as a university textbook.

The author summarizes present-day knowledge of this problem. Worms and viruses have transformed to serious security challenges and perfect instruments of cyber espionage. They have become a tool in information warfare. Cyberattacks transformed to risks calling only for technical responses. The growing awareness of the seriousness of the cyber-threat is enhanced by incidents, e.g. the malware "Stuxnet" attacking the Iranian nuclear programme. Actually, cyber space is regarded as a fifth dimension of military deployment, apart for land, air, water, and cosmos. Some nations are already investing massively in cyber capabilities that can be used for military purposes. Most Western nations have considerably stepped up their defences in recent years and are forming special units for cyber warfare.

This treatise is a follow-up to an article by the same author in Military Review No. 2, 2012, dealing with legal and illegal war after 1990. Now the author concentrates on another key question: the legitimacy and the unlawfulness of force deployments in internationalrelations. The paper is grounded on fundamental works by the former Australian foreign secretary Gareth Evans, setting international rules or criteria determining when it is right to fight. The effectiveness of the global security system is not only on the legality of its security decisions, military actions, but the common perception of their legitimacy-whether they are made on solid evidentiary grounds, for the right reasons, morally as well as legally.

Unlike the real state of affairs, the scenarios for Europe 2010 did not presuppose the rise of financial and economy crises. Political scientists did not perceive the series of terrorist attacks, namely in Great Britain, Spain and Russia. Security questions, home security and defence, came to the foreground more then was originally expected. There are hubs of future power blocks of divided Europe. It is impossible to incorporate all the results and consequences of our presuppositions. Since we want to look into individual, particularly interesting developments, the author recommends to create several teams for individual scenarios, instead of drawing several scenarios by one scholarly team.