Fulltext search in archive

Příspěvek se zabývá vybranými bezpečnostními aspekty námořních hraničních linií Státu Izrael. V krátkosti vymezuje současnou organizaci izraelského válečného námořnictva a jeho vybavení pro zabezpečování izraelské svrchovanosti proti hrozbám přicházejícím z moře, včetně zadržovacích operací vedoucích k zabránění šíření zbraní do rukou protiizraelských teroristických organizací. V souvislosti s izraelskou námořní blokádou pásma Gazy je komentována legitimita takového kroku a mezinárodněpolitické konsekvence jejího vynucování. Ekonomické souvislosti přetrvávajících problémů stran izraelské námořní hranice jsou evidentní na příkladu sporu o právo k využití podmořských nalezišť plynu.

The article deals with the development of the security system since the November 1989 events. Special attention is paid to the situation near the year 2005, when the last opportunity to update a comprehensive concept of security system occurred. The text deals with the comprehensive management of the security system issue. The authors of the article present key events and strategic documents forming the current shape of the Czech security system. In the final part of article, you can find the proposal of the strategic document management system within the security development system. Article results in the knowledge that the modern security system concept is still challenge for us.

The article explains the meaning of strategy documents covering forces' deployment in future operations, i.e. operational concepts and aspects of their development. The authors concentrate first on approaches to their optimal structures and use history examples taken from both Alliance and Czech environments. Secondly they discuss the latest initiatives of this kind in NATO, the formation of a document under the title "Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO)". After its approval, this document is going to be a crucial groundwork for all defence planning, not only in the Alliance scope, but in every member state. The scientific attitudes and employed methods of introducing the FFAO are closely watched by the Czech security community, mainly by the specialists of defence department, with the aim to adjust them into the processing of individual national documents.

The article provides necessary information about the link between lifelong learning and the education and training of personnel within the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic sector. It offers the information about the relationship between the class management system and distance and electronic education. It deals with the implementation of the class management system in career courses of professional soldiers under the auspices of the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of the University of Defence. It clarifies the course of study in career courses, identifies the problems and generates their possible solutions.

There are many reasons to start learning French. With the involvement of our professionals in missions in Mali, it has also become desirable to improve their language skills before their departure. We interviewed those who attended the language courses at the Language Centre of the University of Defence. They confirm that the knowledge of English is not always sufficient. This interview can be inspiring for those who are going to fulfil their duties in the missions in the African continent. We also present statistical data related to the number of French-speaking Czech soldiers and some tips how to maintain the level of French after completing a course.

The process of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces is not ideal for several reasons. One of them is the underestimation of the process by top management. Another one is the low level of awareness of the process, institutions, possibilities and importance of the Lessons Learned Process as a whole. The aim of this article is to clarify the Lessons Learned Process as a tool to support the organization. The first part of the article deals with the process of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces including terminology. The second part of the article describes the factual implementation of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces. It points out achievements as well as drawbacks during its implementation. In addition to that, it introduces the current Czech military publications dealing with this topic. The conclusion presents the description of some suggestions and recommendations for further development of this process.

The article deals with correlation of strategy and operational art. The aim of the article is to point on deficit of relationship between political decision-making and military planning. The first part of the article simply introduces doctrinal tools of operational art, applicable at both the operational and strategic level. The second part refers to the fact that application of some standard elements of operational art in terms of overall strategic framework loses partly importance because of their use in the context of unconventional conflict has been less appropriate. The third part deals with criticism of the mutual undesirable separation of politicians and military professionals involved in operations planning. Conclusion of the article offers possible solutions of this deficit.

There are two great interpreters of the Napoleonic experience, Jomini and Clausewitz. Both were interested in the application of military force to achieve political goals. The article familiarizes readers with Jomini's theoretical fundamentals of operational design elements, namely the lines of operations. Jomini left a great mark on the details of strategic planning: campaign planning, the selection of the theatre of operation, the base of operation, the line of operation, and decisive points. At the end of this process of selection was the final deployment for the decisive battle. Jomini's major contribution, then, was to provide the geometry of the battle space. In his investigation of the nature of war he developed several key operational concepts. As an operational art tools they help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept of operational lines is evolved in all operational functions in terms of ongoing military missions.

The Command and Control process may be defined as an ability to determine what to do and implement effective actions. With the use of the Standard Operating Procedures, the commander must be able to realize set tasks in defined time. The C2 system must be able to monitor and collect data on the situation, to develop an understanding of the situation, to develop a course(s) of action and select one, to develop a plan to execute the selected course of action, to execute the plan, to include providing direction and leadership to subordinates, to monitor execution of the plan and adapt as necessary. The commander draws the picture of situation on the base of surveillance and data collection from various sources, classified and unclassified. The context of information is formed by means of paradigm of personal experiences of commander and his intuition.

The article continues explanation basic operational terms, familiarizes readers with true theoretical fundamentals of the key element of operational design - the decisive point. Basic doctrinal interpretations are described and explained. Its introduction and utilization is visible during the operational planning process and elaboration of operational design. The concept of decisive point has a close connection to the other concepts, namely lines of operations, the centre of gravity and the end state. The concept is further evolved via example of peace support military operation planning process. Key words: decisive points, decisive conditions, lines of operations, centre of gravity, effect, kinetic, nonkinetic operations, doctrine.

The specification of terminology related to terms command and control (C2) is quite important for further scholarly examination of military science. The command and control area is nowadays under the constant impact of the influx of information technology, as well as it is affected by the changes in the contemporary security environment. This article is dedicated to the military, its history, and its contributions to current military operations. It provides an attempt to specify terms "command and control" in both general and military levels. Finally, it provides clarification of the terminology within command and control systems, as their terminology has been changing. In a simple way, the C2 could be characterized as the execution of authority by the commander, via communication and information systems, with the use of current standard operational procedures, under present laws and rules, to act in the interest of forces to meet assigned orders and intentions.

The main Alliance mission is to "safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries" and to "deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any of them". Those general tasks are tailored today to changed international security surroundings. In May this year, a report by the experts group was released, forming the basis for further negotiations over the new strategical concept of NATO. The experts produced a document of first-rate quality identifying main tasks NATO is facing today. At the same time this document redefines prospective directions the Alliance should follow in the years to come. Without a broad popular support NATO's engagements namely off European territory couldn't be vindicated and justified. The same is true as far allocation of sources for NATO missions and developing military capabilities are concerned. So, the communication with public thus becomes a further dimension of this highest strategic document.

There are three protective emblems in use: the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and the Red Crystal. As protection symbols, they are used in armed conflicts to mark persons and objects (buildings, vehicles, etc.) which are working in compliance with the rules of the Geneva Conventions. The cross, crescent or crystal must be used alone for what is termed "protective" use, to safeguard relief workers. The article predominantly deals with the third protocol emblem also known as the Red Crystal. In short it summarizes its history. Because of the controversy over Israel's national society Magen David Adom and a number of other disputes, the introduction of an additional neutral protection symbol had been under discussion for a number of years. In fact, this symbol is quite unknown in our country.

The article deals with the disintegration and erosion of originally cohesive Chechen resistance movement during the First Chechen War and following inter-war period. According to the author, the main reasons of this process are criminality and religious fundamental radicalisation. They together produced inner confl icts between fi eld commanders; some of them attacked Russian security forces in neighbouring regions (Dagestan, Ingushetia), even after war had ended. Disintegration processes were encouraged by social deprivation after the first war, by strategical position of Chechnya in relation to smuggling drugs and weapons, stealing rude oil, and fi nally activities of foreign Islamic solidarity fi ghters. All those factors signifi cantly contributed to the outbreak of the Second Chechnya War.

Taking into account the prepared 2011 Security Strategy and the White Paper on Defence in our country, due attention ought to be paid to political ambitions and economy influence of emerging actors, both world and regional. In ten or twenty years to come we shall face basic transformation of international system. Today, there are four main global power centres: North America (United States, Canada), the European Union, China and Japan. The author of this study concentrates predominantly on their economy strength that is also a base of all sources spent on armed forces. Among emerging powers belongs above all India, regional power in South Asia, Brazil in Latin America, followed by Indonesia, Turkey, and Mexico. They together cover 52 per cent of word's economy production. Different interests give rise to various disputes, but they are able to act cohesively against e.g. decisions by G-20. Among other's the article is accompanied by the table comparing military powers of the USA and Russia.

The deteriorating situation in the Afghanistan region poses a security threat not just to the United States, but to every single nation. It was from that remote area of the world that Al Qai'da plotted 9/11 and subsequent attacks in Europe and elsewhere. Reading news about Afghanistan today gives rise to the question why the situation in this country is such as now really is. Ordinary mass media depict the country often in a confusing manner: Afghanistan as "a country, full of terrorists and uneducated barbarians, longing to destroy western civilization and kill". The author describes bad security situation which presents problem for both coalition soldiers and local Afghanistan population. At the same time we must realize that involved soldiers are exposed every day to asymmetric enemy forces, they stand face to face to mortar danger that could be hidden in for example in every car passing by.

Animals have been used for military purposes from the ancient world to nowadays. Horses, elephants, mules and camels were carrying supplies and took part in battles. Dogs were trained for securing livestock and military camps. Soviet army used them as live mines during World War II. The U.S. Army explored the possibility of using bats as live incendive devices. Even the terrorists could use animals for destroying chosen targets in the same way armies used to do. The deployment of animals would be advantageous for any terrorist group because security forces would not expect this kind of attack. Up to now, there have been just a few cases of abusing animals by terrorists, e.g. for bomb laden mules or dogs carcasses which hide explosive devices. But animals could also help with the fight against terrorism, for example dogs or bluegill fish.

There are no military conflicts without deception, as it is among others a very cheap method how to contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. Military deception (MILDEC) is applicable across a wide range of military operations. MILDEC can be conducted during all phases of military operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. According to he author, the operational deception is to be explained in more detail, basic rules are to be outlined, including fundamental principles and methods of deception for operational planning.

The author summarizes present-day knowledge of this problem. Worms and viruses have transformed to serious security challenges and perfect instruments of cyber espionage. They have become a tool in information warfare. Cyberattacks transformed to risks calling only for technical responses. The growing awareness of the seriousness of the cyber-threat is enhanced by incidents, e.g. the malware "Stuxnet" attacking the Iranian nuclear programme. Actually, cyber space is regarded as a fifth dimension of military deployment, apart for land, air, water, and cosmos. Some nations are already investing massively in cyber capabilities that can be used for military purposes. Most Western nations have considerably stepped up their defences in recent years and are forming special units for cyber warfare.

The article is freely connected with the article United Nation Military Observer published in this Military Revue No 3, 2013, where the role of UN military observer was specified, i.e. as a member of an international peace support operation and military peace engagement. This following article mainly deals with UN military observer training procedures and concentrates on the classification of this training category. The lager part of the article is focused on military observers´ general preparation and its subjects and contents. In respective chapters, there are individual items of this training and their implementation explained, partly in the ACR. Finally, the author opens the question of chances to implement some neglected types of military observer's schooling, specific mission training, in-place training, and refresh training.

This paper is above all a quick piece of information on current problem which could have provoked a large war in the Middle East. And also about a unique operation to resolve it. Syrian chemical weapons used to be a serious threat to the entire Middle East, mainly in the context of the ongoing civil war. This was confirmed by repeated use of nerve agent sarin during the conflict. The destruction of Syrian chemical weapons eliminated the threat of escalation of the conflict and its extension to other countries.

This paper deals with a geospatial support at a strategic level, especially with the production of rapid map products, presenting at this level the most required product type. Backed by their own working experiences from both NATO and EU command structures, the authors describe requirements for geospatial products created at a strategy level, emphasizing the importance of respecting the general cartographic principles. The authors compare the general technology of thematic map production, making use of Geographic Information System, technology, with the technology specific to the strategic level. They also describe the specifics of production at that level, presenting examples both similarities and differences between geospatial support in NATO and the EU.

Europe is a maritime continent whose economic concerns and security could be backed only by the power of navy forces. The Czech Republic is not a maritime state, but it is a member country of both NATO and the EU, it participates in the formation of common security policy. Czech soldiers could take part in combined joint military operations, where one of forces is also a Navy. Dozens of Czech citizens are employed in common international institutes and staffs; they all need a broader view, including the knowledge of Integrated European Naval Strategy. Their activities promote the status of the Czech Republic at international level.
This contribution contextually explores European space and its naval power. It introduces naval forces projection of European national navies, the bulk of which best respond to current security issues, along with decisions of the national governments of the EU and NATO member states. The article also dedicates extensive attention to the Russian naval strategy.

The Russian armed forces are influenced by a new concept of possible armed conflict. At present, Russian forces are not preparing themselves to one massive conflict, as in the period of bi-polar world, but the main stress is put on power-projection, into the spheres of Russian interests, i. e. into post-soviet republics. The Russian armed forces ought to be able partake in three regional conflicts simultaneously. That's why organizational and technological changes are presently in motion. The acquisition of French first Mistral-class vessels is an organic part of this process. The theme is particularly topical in the context of the current Ukrainian crisis.

The paper is focused on the area of defence sources in the Czech Republic. Within an analysis of the actual situation in military spending in the Czech Republic, some potential approaches are defined to enable the reasonable and transparent allocation of resources for national defence. Based on these approaches, three courses of action are derived in order to deal with current resources inadequacy and instability in defence.

The article is available only in the Czech language. For more information please contact editors.

The consequences of economic recession and their impact on national defence budgets can indeed heavily hamper the credibility of both NATO and the EU. A need for coping with budget restrictions and ongoing security crisis in the Ukraine re-opens the issue of common European armed forces as an effective tool for keeping security stability not only in Europe, but also around the world. However, the key issue is to what extent it is feasible to develop autonomous European armed forces operating independently of transatlantic allies, while there is a very strong NATO-EU interconnection in the area of military capability development.

Asymmetric operations lack some linear qualifications at operational levels and split themselves into dozens of tactical warfares. This type of warfare demands quick analytical thinking tied with intelligence preparation of the battlefield, formulating specific information requirement to fill in the missing elements in information requests. As to technological potential, military intelligence is developing very fast. So, the intelligence analysts transfer the main information burden on various information systems, e.g. JSTARS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System), AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), ASAS (All Source Analysis System), or JDISS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System). But large capacities of those systems gave rise to another logical judgement that leads to different interpretation of intelligence data, i.e. the judgements corresponding to higher levels (operational and above) of analytical thinking. Nevertheless, tactical warfare represents operations of small tactical units and this fact puts the main burden on an intelligence analyst who must very quickly cover the gaps in intelligence reports and adopt appropriate decisions.

In the September Scottish referendum of its separation from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the majority of Scottish voters decided against these efforts. But in case of success, Scottish nationalists originally projected considerable military forces. A five-million nation should have had defence budget of 2.5 billion pounds a year, which is in fact roughly a double of the Czech defence budget! During subsequent ten years after independence, the new Scottish Government planned armed forces of 15,000 regular and another five thousand reserve personnel. The article focuses on this rather unknown dimension of Scottish independence debate.

The ability to deliver information about an incident, long time before it has happened, puts intelligence analysts into the very first line of fight against the threat of terrorism, extremism, proliferation, or activities of alien services. The article deals with some aspects of intelligence research that often influence the value of final reports, presented to their consumers. It analyses intelligence database designated for its end users. It simultaneously reflects the question of indications and warnings against opponent's surprise attacks. Last but not least, the purpose of this article is both to attract the readers´ attention to this theme and also to start debate on the methods of predictions of future threats, drawn up by analysts´ teams, as their reports are not always suitably recognized by their end users.