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Under the definition, the present management covers leading the people, implementation of tasks, processes, so that the organization could achieve set prospective targets. Its structure in the ACR is pyramidal and it is divided into vertical and horizontal elements, so is economic management. The purpose of this article is to outline orientation in the education scheme of new professional soldiers - economic experts - to make easier to integrate them into everyday life in units and institutions of the ACR.

The China's impact on world affairs is growing and will grow further in decades to come. Those years will be critical for Taiwan, and for its relationship with other states. Three related factors determine the texture of this interaction: the policies evolving in Beijing, internal developments on Taiwan, and the international environment. Beijing has offered Taipei several proposals for reunification. The proposals, including the recent "one state, two systems" proposal, allow Taipei to maintain its social and economic system, its armed forces and its unofficial ties with foreign countries. China's grand strategy is to make war while avoiding the battle. Therefore, Taiwan is to be persuaded that the acceptance of "One China" principle is vitally important for preventing the Taiwanese independence. Otherwise, People's Armed Forces will open an invasion to Taiwan by three successive attacks: (1) high precise medium-range ballistic missiles DF-21C with the aim to suppress air defence; (2) the second stroke would be massive attack with short-range precise missiles; (3) the last stroke ought to be done by cruise missiles. This essay is adapted from articles by Mary C. Fitzgerald and Eric A. McVadon, Armed Forces Journal 11/2005.

In today's conflicts, such as the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat is more difficult to define; in fact, there are often multiple threats working against our forces concurrently. Our army lacks first-hand information from current battlefields, so that the author must make use of mediated experiences. The paper is therefore based upon articles from foreign military magazines, namely Intelligence Synchronization on a Nonlinear Battlefield (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 4/2004) and Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operation (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1/1997). It is not a mere translation or compilation, but ingenious summing up of discussed ideas. In this study, the author thinks over intelligence synchronization and proposes a new way of looking at it. Methodology heads from priority intelligence requirements towards specific information requirements, via indicators, and so on. The purpose of intelligence synchronization is to focus efforts to build, refine, or clarify the commander's understanding of the battlefield and the threat.

All NATO nations and their armies are looking for effective exploiting social sources for defence and security. It is clear now that effective spending of public expenses asks for changed infrastructures of forces and their activities. It is necessary to form teams of experts who will cooperate with leading defence officials while setting the most suitable variants of further advance.

Even after the Cold War, our world is full of local and international conflicts. There were dozens of wars, fringe clashes between local opposing groups in Africa, Asia and so on. Among them there were four wars of lager size, with more than thousands of deaths in each of them that could be characterized as international wars: Desert Storm 1991, Iraqi Freedom 2003, Allied Strength 1999, and Enduring Freedom 2001. Now we can look at them from a distance ...217 Problems tied with those large-scale wars have several levels: supranational (international) level and military level, being accompanied by paradoxes: international and political paradoxes and military ones. This influenced structures and methods of training and preparation of Australian, Britain and US forces. The lessons were embedded into their military concepts, rules and regulations, e.g. Complex Warfighting (Australia), Future Land Operating Concept (UK), Field Manual: Interim Counterinsurgency Operations (US). New roles of military forces, global and local implications, ought to be embedded also into the structures and concepts of the Army of the Czech Republic, concludes the author.

From economic point of view, the army of every nation spends immense sources from the state budget. To spent sources economically, the officers - managers economists have to be educated in economic science, i.e. they ought to acquire proper economic knowledge, systematically, during his military studies, in army college, or defence university. One of many things the ACR is missing is an economic course explaining army officials above all how to find adequate proportion between costs and incomes, not to make decision only intuitively.

In essence, the world is organizing itself in a series of interconnected networks. The information revolution will cause shifts, both in how societies may come into conflict and how their armed forces may wage war. Cyber war is coming. Its concept refers to information-related conflict both at a grand level, between nations or societies, and at low levels of international subgroups, e.g. terrorists of any kind, e.g. Al Qaeda, etc. The concept may involve public diplomacy measures, political and cultural subversion, deception or interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements across computer networks. Terrorists may build mutual connections, shape opinions in target groups, and conduct intense propaganda and psychological operations campaigns. Guerrilla warfare in cyberspace can use those networks to maximize their political, economic, and social power while minimizing the military aspects until the final offensive. The source: T. Hammes, Jane's Defence Weekly, 5/2005 (nas).

The article deals with the teaching of management at the University of Defence. Its authors are long-standing university teachers, possessing also experiences from command and staff appointments. In recent years, the emphasis in military schools has shifted more to subjects indirectly related to civilian courses of study, e.g. the theory of management. At the Defence University Brno it covers a wide range of other subjects: economy, informatics, operational investigation, etc.; other subjects are in fact only "supporting": applied mathematics, sociology, psychology, humane resource control and law. Military management, theory of military operations, staff service, and that belong to the group of applied fundamentals. At present, "military management" at the Defence University has only a limited scope of teaching units. It is read both at bachelor and master levels of studies, inevitably many themes are duplicated. So, among others, the authors recommend to shift the core of military management teaching to higher levels of studies, at master levels.

This new generation war could be characterized by an emphasis on nonstate actors, by political and psychological forms of attacks that directly influence opponents. Other characteristics are as follows: extensive refugee flows, violence, transnational criminal aspects. Several factors will impact the nature, frequency and character of "small wars" in the 21st century. Failed/failing states, urbanization, diffusion of actors, communications technology, technological diffusion, religion, and ultra-terrorism. Clausewitz's fundamental appreciation for the primacy of political objectives as the guiding object in war remains relevant to "small wars" as does to interstate conflicts. The problem for today's strategist or policy maker is determining exactly what has changed, how the various means of stratecraft need to be adapted to the specific contingency at hand (according to The Journal of Strategic Studies, 6/2005).

Since the 90's of the last century we have witnessed the discussions over extended concept of security, under which no national state is the only privileged security subject. The classical military concept is extended both "above", towards international, global and regional problems covering economy, social, environmental or humane issues and "down", in the direction of local communities, NGOs, private subjects and even individual citizens. Even though several important constitutional laws reflecting EU criteria were adopted, we still miss constituting and complete overall concept Czech security system. Of course, we have a document "Optimalization of Security System of the Czech Republic", but it is not the genuine concept, but a mere summary of practical measures dealing with temporary problems, namely after the Floods 2002. The author dares the public to open debate about priorities and goals of security politics of our country, in order to lay down, under general consensus, realistic security system, able to face the whole range of security threats and risks, explicitly in the broad international frame of NATO and EU.

The article presents the results of pedagogical experiment in shooting from smallarms at training on shooting trainers, as indispensable instruments for the preparation of military professionals in indoor and outdoor shooting. Computer-generated simulators enable to experience the practice of shooting both for beginners training, as well as for marksmen, and sharpshooters. The trainers we we've developed in our army are as follows: shooting trainer EVJ-91 (optical, infrared), EVJ-94 (advanced, computer aided), EVJ-94/M (five targets), UNIST-94 (screen 2x3 m, VCR, UNIST-97/L
(laser emitter, live shooting), optical shooting range OS-1, OS-3 (small arms practice, up to 50 m, computer-aided,
laser emitter), optical target range TOS-1 (combat fire arms practice, computer-aided evaluation), optical range POS-1 (target devices are replaced by a film screen, VCR), Minitos Duo (tested), combat video-system Dicrosec PSC (interactive), or SOT-1 (rotary targets). Even though those trainers save time and money, we must still bear in mind that live shooting can't be replaced by any trainer.

Building up a picture of adversaries in complicated operations other than war (OOTW) requires fresh thinking on the collection and analysis of intelligence material, writes Dr Dave Sloggett in Jane's Defence Weekly No 48/2005. Operations undertaken in present-day theatres include the need to arrest war criminals, defeat insurgency operations and disrupt the activities from those engaged in criminal activities that do not respect national boundaries (trafficking, drugs smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass effect). OOTW pose problems for the development of what is now referred to as effects-based operations, where the use of kinetic devices to destroy a target is one way to achieve an outcome. One important element of a solution is to build common definitions of terms that enable a discipline to be brought to the underlying freedom of authors compiling contact reports. Projects such as Dabinett, a multifaceted system of systems programme, can link together information contained in existing systems. Commanders able to exploit this capability, against the complex background in which OOTW are conducted, will truly take superior decisions.

Those three E are much in use both in official documents and mass media. Dozens of defence officials use them every day, but actual outputs present that they do not know the key essence of 3E, or they are not aware of how to put them into practice. This article would like to help them to make understand the practical application of basic principles of 3E in practise. The reason of this gap, according to the author, lies in insufficient ties between theoretical and executive spheres of defence sector.

Answering the commander's intelligence and decision needs is an uneasy task for any person responsible for intelligence. PIR information help the commander to keep knowledge on relevant environment during peacekeeping, stability and supporting operations, which are different from PIR in offensive and defensive operations. In combat operations, PIR focuses on enemy's military capability and intentions. Intelligence collection in stability and support operations may adjust to the people and their cultures, politics, religions, economics and related factors. The commander must have information telling on current enemy's threats, fighters, as well as on information ranging from standard of living of local population, supplies of electric power, to building a municipal school. Shortly, to have information behind the traditional scope of PIR. But the current Czech regulation MO/VZS 2003 does not explain similar situations, the only examples we can find are those in US Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.