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The exercise was a continuation of series of exercises that were conducted in previous years. Among others, participants of the CPX were representatives of Defence University Brno, National Defence Academy Vienna, Austria, and the Armed Forces Academy, Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia. During the exercise, in imaginary region POPRADLAND, there were practiced various basis aspects of forces preparations and engagement that focus on EU Battle Group in Area of Responsibility, explaining forming commander and staff's decision-making process at the level of Battalion Task Force, during operational planning and its engagement in action. At the end the Officer Conducting the Exercise certified that participants in the CPX fulfilled set goals and aims of this exercise sucessfully. The exercise was designated maily for members of Higher and Basic Command and Staff Courses.

The NATO Washington Summit in 1999 discussed Defence Capability Initiatives to increase Alliance defence potential together with capacities for accelerated deployability and mobility of NATO forces. This fact was underlined during Prague Summit 2002. One of Prague Capabilities Commitments is the requirement of deployability and sustainability in operations. Among others, this requirement is met by Memorandum of Understanding and bilateral agreements. The Czech Republic is involved in activities of international organizations, enumerated in this article. We support a principle of specialization, the concentration to limited, part-time scale of transport capacities operating for Czech peacekeeping missions. Active participation in the Movement Coordination Centre Europe could be the leading pattern for synergic cooperation in the field of strategic transport.

Contemporary military psychology tries to augment psychic resistance to various forms of stress arising during carrying out the tasks of military profession. Generally speaking, there is both quantitative aspect to labour (military profession), i.e. amount, effort and time, and a qualitative one, i.e. intelligence and skill. The availability of particular types of labour can influence the location of their activities. From the point of military professionals, the soldier is exposed to three factors: sensorial, mental and emotional loads. Modern military psychology defines basis schemes and methods for psychological preparation of servicemen, it uses psychological experiments that lately enable to predict behaviour of military personnel and serve as a guideline to realize manpower's potential in the most effective ways. Proper preparedness and training help to prolong high soldiers' deployment even in high demanding surroundings.

As the world grows ever more urbanized, the Air Force prepares airmen to fight in cities. They are complex domains where military operations are congested by terrain and by the danger of collateral damage and the risk to non-combatants. The Air Force supports the joint force by providing valuable airspace control, command and control, communications and psychological operations support, close-air support, terminal attack control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue. But Air Force capabilities in the urban are not just the supporting force for urban operations, it has ability to provide strategic attack against critical urban area. Based upon an article by Lt.Col. Brian M. Newberry in Armed Forces Journal, September 2006.

This article presents the findings of the survey being done during the evaluation and assessment of EU Battle Groups, their missions, roles, tasks, stemming from the requirements set by the EU Crisis Management Concept. The paper does not discuss in detail variants EU Battle Groups, but concentrates on their historical background, basic characteristics, structure, EU political-military ambitions, scenarios, reaction time, tasks, standards, training and certification, Battle Groups commitments, concept and implementation, achievements. The article also includes recommendations for the Czech Armed Forces that are currently involved in the formation of the EU Battle Group CZE/SVK. This article aims to record progress to date and to indicate challenges ahead. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Conventional military strategists did not hold counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare with high esteem. In fact, strategists often marginalized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discussions. But true strategic thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare consider time and space and long strategic view. Now we must consider critical areas for the global war on terrorism (GWOT), including changing nature of the threat environment. Sources: Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, by E. Cohen, Lt.Col. C. Crane, Lt.Col. J. Horvath, Lt.Col. J. Nagl; Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency by Col. J. B. Celeski in Military Review March-April 2006.

This thoroughly elaborated paper deals with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Similar missions represent NATO's global interests in problems of word's security. Afghanistan is the very place where new warfare methods are tested, new ways of combat come into existence. After September 11, 2001, American administration declared the war to global terrorism - GWOT (Global War on Terror), the first theatre of GWOT became Afghanistan. From military point of view, it was unambiguous success, to a large degree, it succeeded even politically. But Afghanistan was negatively affected by the situation in Iraq. Afghanistan is far off being stabilized. Local warlords, tribal chiefs, called anti-coalition militants (ACMs), avoid regular warfare, they use raids, sabotages, acts of terror, provocations. Coalition units use e.g. PSYOP operations, as a way how to implement norms based deterrence.

There is a substantional difference between reformation and transformation. The latter represents a qualitative change or the re-creation; while the former is only a change, redressing, correction of errors or faults. In Czech military press, the basic principles of NATO transformation were described several times. Since 2004, when the document "Strategic Vision: The Military Vision" was published, many other documents have been released: Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), Guidance for Military Implementation of CPG, Concept for Alliance Future Joint Operations, NATO Task List. Every operational concept has to evaluate all factors from various fields. The method is expressed by the short DOTMLPF, which stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities. The Concept Development and Experimentation is of multinational character and is the most successful transformation tool within NATO countries, namely in the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, Norway, etc. Lessons Learned system supplies feedback between national forces experiences and concepts, via DOTMLPF. The key role is played by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon, Portugal.

Some of the published critiques dealing with midterm planning are not true, as they were created without detailed knowledge of practice and methods how our midterm plan was created. Nevertheless, there are some real faults in midterm planning. According to the author, they are divided into two groups: external-they depend on quality of assignment; and internal-they are connected to the application of theory. Main external fault is the absence of long-term plan. In fact, it was introduced by the Order of Defence Minister, but it has not been worked up thoroughly. We lack adjusting main goals, tasks and priorities for MoD. Next problem are unstable and lacking financial sources. Internal mistakes are as follows: absence of mechanism for balanced changes between cycles of planning; implementation of life cycle cost and level of education of staff preparing data for planning.

The term "security", originally used for the defence of state/national territory, was surpassed by "global security", ranging from world's security situation to monitoring foreign conflicts with the deployment of pre-emptive actions in places with tides of violence, instability. This article describes mentioned complexity of current and future military operational environment dilemma: generally, armed forces are affected by multifaceted circumstances that have to be taken into account and mustn't be ignored or neglected during the preparation and performance of their mission. At present, threat spectrum is characterized by three key characteristics: dynamics, complexity, and lower importance of geographical area. The socalled Long Term Vision EU describes the future military environment which is divided into three components: humane (social), cybernetic (informational, computer, communication), physical (natural, geographic) and is bridging the gap between strategy and capabilities of forces.

Asymmetric operations lack some linear qualifications at operational levels and split themselves into dozens of tactical warfares. This type of warfare demands quick analytical thinking tied with intelligence preparation of the battlefield, formulating specific information requirement to fill in the missing elements in information requests. As to technological potential, military intelligence is developing very fast. So, the intelligence analysts transfer the main information burden on various information systems, e.g. JSTARS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System), AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), ASAS (All Source Analysis System), or JDISS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System). But large capacities of those systems gave rise to another logical judgement that leads to different interpretation of intelligence data, i.e. the judgements corresponding to higher levels (operational and above) of analytical thinking. Nevertheless, tactical warfare represents operations of small tactical units and this fact puts the main burden on an intelligence analyst who must very quickly cover the gaps in intelligence reports and adopt appropriate decisions.

New technologies influence not only social advance, but also the development of armed forces. Present-time warfare is resolute, dynamic. In the 21st century, both low and high intensity conflicts, counterterrorist or stabilization operations might take place in urbanized areas, where casualties and material damages are high. New weaponry and technology make demands on military and professional training, self-control, psychic preparedness. In advance we must set rules governing the firing of weapons and use of force namely by soldiers involved in peacekeeping and counter-insurgency situations. Mental stress, emotional, or physical strain or tension of soldiers are manifested by fanaticism, looting, killing non-combatants, desertions or going away from military units without permission (AWOLs), depressed soldiers inflict wound on themselves, they misuse drugs or alcohol. The author cites factors increasing soldiers' resistance: high cohesion of units, tough training, relaxation, courageousness, high awareness of objectives of operations and war aims.

This article contains main ideas from the essay by James J. Wirtz published in anthology Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, Frank Cass 2003. This theory is a unifying explanation of why states, for example, attempt to surprise their opponents with diplomatic or military initiatives. Surprise often is described as a force multiplier; something that increases the effectiveness of one's forces in combat. The prospect of surprise can prompt political leaders of the weaker side to believe that they can nullify that disparity and achieve their objectives. In other words, if strong parties began to view conflict from the weaker party's perspective, while weak actors kept war's dialectic in mind, then surprise would become less likely. The theory of surprise can identify when it is likely to occur, who is likely to find the element of surprise attractive as a basis of policy or strategy, and who is likely to be its victim. The trick now lies in making operational use of the theory of surprise.

The article deals with the question of unmanned aircraft generally, it doesn't discuss their individual types. Unmanned aircraft (UAVs) are designed to fly without a pilot (that is by remote control), their combat engagements are less risky and potentially less costly. Army officials say that UAVs will serve better, as they will carry more weapons and sturdier avionics, use the same fuel as other service aircraft, and could be operated by soldiers in theatre. Avionics and weapons might be controlled even by a conventional link with ground control stations. One "land pilot" can control several UAVs simultaneously. The running programmes will produce mature technologies and stable designs, making use of critical technologies, control abilities. The other critical technologies are: an engine that uses heavy fuel and an automatic take-off and landing system. As a part of coalition forces, the UAVs had proved their usefulness and serviceability in the Middle East.

In spite of the fact that it is a new concept, it presents one of key methods of international engagement in crisis areas the EU prefers. Its main components are crises prevention and securing stabilization. Security tasks are composite problems solving one of main state functions: to guard external and internal security together with principles of civil control. This essay among others aims to explain practicability of the EU's concept of preventive engagement as a tool of implementation of the European Security Strategy, further it describes European concept for crisis management missions in the field of civilian administration supporting security and justice. At the end there are some recommendations for the Czech Republic how to form capacities for EU missions and for the transformation of Czech security sectors.

Keynesian economics argues that private sector decisions sometimes lead to inefficient macroeconomic outcomes and therefore advocates active policy responses by the public sector, including monetary policy actions and fiscal policy actions by the government to stabilize output over the business cycle. This paper defines the core of Keynesian economics in the mirror of defence expenditures and their influence on country's economy growth. The main attention is paid to the analysis of military-industrial complex and its pressure on armed forces, as one of most important factors introducing a danger of the so-called militarization of both state economy of advanced industrial countries and their social life.

Such exercises are regular part of European exercise process that in periodical cycles examines individual capacities of solving crisis situations, conducting crisis operations under methods developed by the EU. European training process does not cover only the preparation of military units, but also those of civil elements (police, rescue teams, diplomats). Since 2007 the exercises have been ran according to a common scenario "ALISIA", with the purpose to practise crisis operations control by commanders and staffs of EU nations, without any means and elements or support by NATO. European exercise process allows to the EUMS to organize and harmonize two exercises of solving crisis situations in a year. Five members of the Czech Army took part in the exercise MILEX 09 last year. They were involved in the operational planning process at the EU OHQ Specialist Staff, CJ2, CJ4, CJ5 and CJ7 departments. The article is mostly based on the experiences of Czech offi cers at the EU OHQ LARISSA.

War game is a simulation of military operations intended to train military commanders or to test a proposed strategy. It is a game in which model soldiers are used to create battles, in order to study tactics. This article illustrates the importance of War Game COAs (course of action). It was tested against opposing force COAs. Such exercise will help to identify advantages and disadvantages and the key elements of execution planning for each COA. The lesson learned during OHQ CZE/SVK BG EU Staff Exercises that took place in Olomouc from January 19th, to January 23rd, and from February 16th, to February 20th, 2009 is that war-gaming (although time consuming) is something closer to "reality" than the "theory" in doctrines. The war-gaming practices teamwork, facilitates team-building and enables to share mental model COA. Commanders and their staff ought to be engaged in simulations and war games more frequently. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials.

Relations between NATO and the Russian Federation are one of key factors influencing overall policy of the whole North Atlantic Alliance. They are complicated and sophisticated questions still predisposed by the heritage of the Cold War.But there are mutual fears, common security problems they both have to counter. NATO policy must be established upon present-day reality. It is self-evident that there are common fields of common interests in which mutual balance must be reached. There are among others: armament, preventing arms proliferation, halting proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical agents, antimissiles defence, counter-terrorism, drugs smuggling, open sea security, common peace operations. After two years the Russian-Georgia war started, military cooperation between Russia and NATO was re-established. Separate problem in midterm prospects presents the solving of conflict in Afghanistan.

The famous quotation from Moliére that says "Grammar, which knows how to control even kings", implies importance of grammar for everyday use. There are many way of the acquisition of grammar. The best or smartest way of teaching grammar is to memorize rules in sentence contexts to bear them in mind for a longer time, and learn those rules more easily. The authoress presents new ways in teaching grammar, expressed in works by several famous authors, Barton, Birch, Chomsky, Hudson, Larsen-Freeman, Patterson, Pennington, Weaver. Those are: communicative and competitive models, together with systematic and consistent procedures, resulting in highly motivated structure of learning grammar. In the core of this process lies the strong personality of language instructor.

In our forces, similarly like in those of Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania, we assess the scope of damages in numbers showing overall labour needed for repair, necessary for restoration complete combat capacity. Now we put into test another method, by means of the so-called S-M-C-A code (Shoot, Mobility, Communication, Armour); e.g. numbers 0-0-0-0 represent fully combat-ready main battle tank, whereas 0-4-0-4 shows immobile armoured vehicle, with perforated armour. To adapt commanders? decisionmaking process and introduce this method into forces, mechanised units, up the battalion level, we perform exercises on ModSAF trainer (Modular Semi-Automated Forces). This method enables us to plan the application of military repair depots, fully recover combat potential of military vehicles as soon as possible. Nowadays, ModSAF methodology is successfully exploited in the Centre for Simulation Technologies in Brno and Vyškov. The Army of the Czech Republic stands at the very same place as modern forces of Alliance, the US, Great Britain, Germany and others, in the 90?s of the last century.

This article deals with the EU command and control functions and provides basic information on the structure and capabilities of the EU CCS in Battle Group EU operations. The author describes political and strategical levels CCS (COREPER, GAERC, COPS, CivCom, EUMC, EUMS, BDE HQ, prospective EU FHQ). Only US, EU and E3 (Britain, France, Germany) are capable to realize integrated expeditional operations. The ACR can work only with cooperation with them. The Czech Republic as a small EU member state is actively engaged in the building of the Battle Group EU. The Czech Army is going to increase its expeditionary capabilities as demanded and be prepared for a broader range of conflicts and crises in the vital area of the EU concerns. At present, the ACR is able to carry out a self-supported, integrated expedition operation only on the edge of all its strength. The political leaders must bear this fact in mind, as the army mustn't be overburdened, otherwise it might lose its credibility. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The article deals with the state of English e-learning on the premises of the University of Defence. The authoress introduces some pages of the electronic materials used for the General Staff Course as an example of modern methods of learning English. She explains the basic principles of the work with these exercises. There is also mentioned the military English interactive CD-Rom that was published last year and is used as the electronic support for learning military English; and also a new CD-Rom that is being developed now is mentioned because it will be used for the General Staff Course participants as well. Because of the fact that Czech military personnel are expected to serve in multinational operations, this interactive CD-Rom will make their language training easier. In the last part of the article, the opinions of the General Staff Course participants on using e-learning materials are given on the basis of questionnaires.

This operation was led by Germany, and made up of elements contributed by twenty EU nations; as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The EU deployed FHQ in Kinshasa and simultaneously kept the over-the-horizon force in Gabon, in order to ensure a deterrent capacity and to avoid unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa. After Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR RD Congo was a second EU largest military operation, involving a total of almost 3,000 soldiers and officers). The co-operation with MONUC was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. The operation demonstrated the EU ability to successfully conduct medium scale autonomous multinational operations within a planned time frame under the UN mandate. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The authors depict the development of outsourcing methods in US armed forces, its origins, and sources. Collected data are accompanied by experiences from British and German armies. The American Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued in 1966 Circular No A-76 (lately several times revisited) to define procedures how to set rules which commercial activities are to be done within the frame of armed forces or in private sector. Backed by a number of literatures, magazines and newspapers (Air Force Journal of Logistics, Air Force Magazine, Armed Forces Journal, Defense Nationale, Washington Technology, Wehrtechnik, etc.) authors analyse several outsourcing processes. They present both positive and negative results, including open or hidden problems of A-76 policy (e.g. business process outsourcing). For the Army of the CR they recommend to overcome above mentioned problems by creating the corrective authority, similar to the British PPPU (PublicPrivate Partnership Unit).

The main theme of this extensive paper is ethical evaluation of the state of affairs in Iraq that would play greater role - directly or indirectly - in the decision-making of foremost politicians, more role then we might think. Although the author quotes various positive or negative attitudes towards the war, he does not intend to prove or refute presented theses. He broadly treats e.g. the so-called just-war, events when imminent threat might be a case for war, moral clarity in a time of war, situations when we consider that our aims might be achieved by peaceful means. Last but not least, he writes about attitudes of church leaders, the Holy See, lines of their reasoning. The armed forces are called upon to do their duty. The greater the threat, the grater is the risk of inaction, the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory actions. In such case, the governments make their final decisions. It is not the responsibility of church-leaders or military commanders. To obey it, it would not be in conflict with the churches teaching. In these circumstances, the troops could regard an order to go to battle as morally decent, in pursuit of a moral good purpose.

As the EU is conducting its third military operation, the EUMS has become a key player in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. In order to provide political control and strategic direction in a crisis, the European Council (Nice, December 2000) decided to establish new permanent political and military structures within the Council of the European Union: PSC-Political and Security Committee, EUMC-European Union Military Committee, EUMS-European Union Military Staff. The EUMS is responsible for peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management (including peacemaking), and further tasks identified in the European Security Strategy, such as joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. As the only permanent integrated military structure of the EU, the EUMS has become the military linchpin of the EU. (Truppendienst, Bundesheer,

90s introduced the new beginning of international and economical relations. The former USSR used to be overmilitarized state that is now transforming into a democratic republic. After 2000, the RF adopted many arrangements to stabilize the fall of Russian defence industry. The poor results of Russian economy motivated the federal government towards forming five defence agencies (in 1999): Russian Aeronautic and Space Agency (aeronautics and rocket industry), Russian Agency for Command and Control Systems (avionics, electronic industry), Russian Agency for Conventional Weaponry (arms and armament industry), Russian Agency for Ordnance and Munitions, Russian Agency for Shipbuilding. Nevertheless, the ageing of redundant and unnecessary military industries demands horizontal integration that might facilitate cooperation among individual enterprises. This process could help to unify military products and concentrate on modern weaponry, to improve applied technologies, corresponding to demands of 21st century forces.