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The article describes the issue of implementing the Resistance Operating Concept as part of a comprehensive approach to ensuring the defense of the state and its resilience. The basic conditions necessary for the introduction of that instrument are sought, and a comparative analysis of selected European countries that started to build a resistance movement is carried out. The article further describes the strategic definition of the resistance movement in the conditions of the Czech Republic, the legislative definition of the resistance movement and its anchoring in the framework of mental law, and the connection of the resistance movement to individual phases of the conflict. It analyzes the relationship of the resistance movement to individual phases of the conflict and categorizes the actors of the resistance movement, their roles and the methods used. In conclusion, it defines the necessary conditions for the implementation of the resistance movement into the security and defense system of the state.

The article deals with the basic characteristics and tactical-technical requirements for the tactical unmanned aerial system (TUAS), which is planned to be implemented in the Czech Armed Forces in the upcoming years. Based on the results of the comparison of the Czech Armed Forces requirements with the parameters corresponding to the TUAS, the Hermes 900 and Heron systems of Israeli production appear to be the most suitable variants. Both aircrafts can represent a comprehensive solution in this area. They both have a long tradition of production, research and development and of course, they both meet the requirements for TUAS within NATO and the European traffic operations accreditation. However, the decisive selection parameter, apart from security risks and compatibility, is also the purchase price. The main goal of the article is to bring a view of the issue from a broader context and to find a possible way-out together with an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the proposed variants.

This paper is derived from "Exploring the Future Operating Environment", published in Joint Force Quarterly, April 2018. The article was presented at the Defense & Strategy 2018 conference, which took place at the University of Defense in Brno on 4-6 June 2018.

The article deals with the issue of identifying required material reserves, also referred to as strategic or emergency reserves. These reserves are managed by state authority as part of national crisis preparedness. The article explores how scenarios can be used as a method for planning, i.e. determining adequate, realistic, and affordable material reserves. A scenario-based analysis, well proven in the defence planning domain, is identified as a method offering a high degree of analytical rigor and traceability of resulting requirements. Selected planning scenarios clearly must reflect national threat/hazard and risk assessments. They also have to reflect other important national policies, such as those governing economy, industry, health care, or environment. The illustrative conduct of the initial steps of the proposed method is demonstrated using Latvia's security policy circumstances.

The article shows that Czech armed forces are supposed to develop planning mechanism according to the Alliance Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) to be fully interoperable in operation planning process (OPP), namely in field operations planning in the framework of the multinational missions abroad. However, some problems persist at the operational level of crisis management, such as institutional arrangements for planning and commanding crisis operations, procedures pertaining to force generation, synchronization and activities coordination. The Czech Army Operational Planning Doctrine is still being developed. The purpose of this article is to inform on current state of affairs in operational planning with subsequent consequences to the results and reform recommendations by the White Paper on Defence.

The purpose of this article is to deal with Course of Actions development (COA). Attention is paid to ensure a common understanding of COA process. The article broadens the vision and offers deep insights for its readers. Moreover, the war game was described as a method of refining or modifying the COA. It has also been emphasized the commander and staff consider each COA advantages and disadvantages. The Czech Army personnel training and preparation should steadily and deliberately bring improvements into the field of operational planning capability within forces´ command levels. In order to improve operational planning knowledge, it is recommended to study AJP-5 Operational Planning Doctrine and ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.

The purpose of this article is to inform on elements of military deception in NATO armies and overarching principles that make military deception successful. Deception Planning is an iterative process that should be considered as an inextricable part of the operational planning. The knowledge in the field of military deception in the Czech military is low; no operational deception plan has been prepared for foreign operations or any military exercise. Deception is widely appreciated as a powerful instrument of military operations, yet it is surprisingly neglected by both the Czech Army and Military Educational System. The author tries to encourage officers and members of higher staffs to study this subject.

The article continues explanation basic operational terms, familiarizes readers with true theoretical fundamentals of the key element of operational design - the decisive point. Basic doctrinal interpretations are described and explained. Its introduction and utilization is visible during the operational planning process and elaboration of operational design. The concept of decisive point has a close connection to the other concepts, namely lines of operations, the centre of gravity and the end state. The concept is further evolved via example of peace support military operation planning process. Key words: decisive points, decisive conditions, lines of operations, centre of gravity, effect, kinetic, nonkinetic operations, doctrine.

The article explains defence planning of armed forces deployment that ought to by the base for all long haul visions and concept texts for army development and its operational employment. Operational scenarios and concepts form together key elements of defence planning process, both factors enable to military organizations not only to identify future security challenges but also to react to challenges in being. It is not contrary to the so-called capability planning process as this is a manly armed force potential backing our ability to face threads and risks in the future. The example of the United States involved in three asymmetric conflicts is a warning example showing the necessity of the complex and coordinated strategical approaches.

All-inclusive attitude of NATO forces assumes that conflict can't be solved only by military means. This shift from purely soldierly level to political brought around numbers of Alliance activities at Strategical and Operational Commands. The common denominator was the philosophy of complex approach in operational thinking, planning, and implementing NATO activities. As a result the operational SACEUR's directive GOP was substituted by its revised successor-the so-called Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). It is going to be introduced in 2011 and will influence groups and military persons at all levels of warfare, dealing with operational planning and operational art for art's sake. The article familiarizes readers with this directive (COPD) as a tool for comprehensive approach to operations. The COPD offers more deliberate and inclusive planning procedures that allow for both military and non-military actors broader understanding of operational environment and better cooperation in their common effort.

Participation of experts form NATO member and partner countries in security situation development trends together with related military implications is meanwhile the newest mean of member states engagement onto NATO Defence Planning. In one hand this possibility is a way to gain findings from national experts and in other hand an opportunity enabling countries to enlarge knowledge and experience of national participants in order to development of similar activities at national level. Moreover there is an opportunity to present activities of nations´ institutions working in the similar field as well as national findings linked to security trends and defence planning. The author concludes that the Czech Republic has not yet formulated its own defence planning process, and suggests the possible effects of this condition

The aim of the article is to bring out results of the comparative analysis of NATO and EU defence planning processes. The comparative analysis was focused on identification of those findings which are identical for both NATO and the EU and which might be also beneficial for optimising the national defence planning process within the Czech Ministry of Defence. From this perspective, the key analysis outcome is identification of similar phases which were found out while comparing respective NATO´s and EU´s planning tools, i.e. J-DARTS and SAEP Process. Even if NATO and the EU are using a different terminology and different approaches to achieve expected results, the substance of respective phases is almost identical. A course of action how to implement the analysis outcomes into the national defence planning process might be the subject of a follow on research.

It is a point at which attacking forces are unable to continue their attack or even defend themselves, because do casualties, shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations, and sheer physical exhaustion. This sequel article deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the culminating point operational concept. The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas and concepts described in his book "On War", doctrinal publications analysis and study projects of the operational art theorists. It treats conditions influencing achievement of the culminating point on single levels of war-strategic, operational and tactical and highlights coherences and factors having fundamental influences on culmination. The article is accompanied by several graphs describing this theory in detail. Key words: Culmination, Culminating Point, Zeroing, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Campaign Planning and Developing Operations.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

The Centres of Gravity (COG) are characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. The COG belongs among the most important operational concepts. It is the main source of power and strength. Without dermining enemy's COG we are not able to carry out any quick and resolute action, to reach ordered tasks, desired objectives. The primary purpose of this article is to offer basic information about this subject. This first part is concentrated predominantly to Carl von Clausewitz's ideas. The article especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the COG theory in confrontation with contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. It highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

The paper deals with the issue of the purpose, creation and practical use of scenarios during operational concepts development. The scenar- ios reflect the fundamental characteristics of the environment in which the military missions will be conducted in the next 15-20 years. The paper defines the type of scenarios useful for creation of operational concepts and requirements that must be met for a successful process of scenarios development. Further, it describes the process of scenarios development, the main risks associated with this process while suggesting the possibility of reducing the rate of those risks.

The author of this article considers the prospective changes in the development, character, missions and tasks of the Army of the Czech Republic, Those changes are deduced from the changing security environment and long-term development trends. To meet new demands, we must continue in building interoperability and compatibility. The battlefield operations will be planned and controlled by the systems of "Network Centric Warfare" and "Reach Back Operations". It will not be necessary for a commander to be in physical contact with operational theatre. Electronical high speed intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance will enable the high pace of military operations (together with common analyses, integration of collected data, evaluation of enemy's intents and activities). This will enable to build a credible defence, in the frame of collective security system, hand in hand with other NATO allies.

This article covers the EUFOR RD Congo operation preparation phase and provides information on Military Strategic Planning Process, Military Operational Planning, Collaborative Planning, EU OHQ Potsdam activation and Force Generation Process. It describes planning period to highlight a pivotal role of training and education. Operation EUFOR RD CONGO was the EU second military intervention in the RDC, following Operation Artemis in 2003. The EUFOR RD CONGO mission was to support MONUC during running election process, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1671, authorizing the temporary deployment of an EU force in the RDC. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech MoD. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Operations by Lt.Col. Ing. Jaroslav Moravčík. NATO's current operational experience and that from other operations indicates that purely military actions cannot resolve a complex emergency of crisis. The requirement for the military to interact with non-military actors shows a new, more comprehensive approach. In response, NATO's Effect-Based Approach to Operations was highlighted. The four functions of EBAO and their related activities are mutually supportive. The functions are carried out in a continuous, interactive, parallel process and should not be regarded as sequential steps. They are as follows: Knowledge development; Effect-based planning; Effect-based execution; and Engagement space assessment. EBAO recognizes the importance of applying the various instruments available to the Alliance to create overall effects that will lead to crisis resolution. Achieving synergies amongst NATO and non-NATO actors will enable to identify better how it may best harmonize its contribution with other actors involved in a crisis.

In the past, the Common Funding played only marginal role in the NATO strategic decision-making. However, this situation changed significantly when the global economic crisis challenged the national public expenditures and NATO defence policy became a matter of serious reflections. NATO should balance its requirements with limited resources and adjust its future activities within shrinking budgets. NATO must make hard decisions and implement reforms in order to ensure its ability to fulfil its mission and priority tasks in the long run. The reconfiguration of Common Funding is an inherent part of this process. The aim of this article is to introduce Common Funding as a management-supporting tool of the international organisation under currently mounting resource constrains.

Operational art is the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. This article is a sequel to the study published in a previous issue of this Military Revue. The author discusses the fundamental pillars of operational art, upon which Alliance countries build their doctrinal and defence documents concerning operational art. A separate section deals with conditions and status of operational art in the Army of the Czech Republic in the last 20 years. The author calls for the need to introduce operational art in several key areas of Czech doctrines. He recalls the necessity to implement those issues in the prepared Doctrine of the ACR.

Understanding the importance and role of present-day operational art is not always a matter of knowledge of relevant doctrinal publications or the use of experiences from military operations. Number of aspects of operational art had their roots deep in the history of warfare. Many of them are unknown or forgotten. This article aims to give the reader some basic information about the context that led to the awareness of the need of operational art and finally to real fulfilling the imaginary gap between strategy and tactics, which was the place for operational art. The article briefly describes the background of the emergence of operational art and the approach of two basic schools of military theory: Soviet and German that were crucial to its development.

The article polemize against the content of the article "Operational Art" that was published in the previous issue of this Czech Military Review, 3/2011. The polemics points out that the author of the criticized article applied doctrinally incorrect terminology, he did not respect the valid standards of the military terminology and is cross-indexing to the old Allied standards. Such articles should present new lessons from field theory and practice, which would contribute to the professional preparedness of the military personnel, and to the required interoperability with our coalition partners. But according to the authors, criticized article is rather misleading. Key words: operational art, operations, operational concept, center of gravity.

The article is involved in the problems of providing humanitarian aid. The authors analyze legislative and social surroundings upon which the humanitarian assistance is rendered by the Army of the Czech Republic. They characterize various forms of non-governmental organizations in our country and the conditions under which the Czech Army is allowed to cooperate with them. There are many special features in providing assistance, namely as far as members of various church denominations in the Czech Republic are concerned. The list of selected denominations with their short profiles is enclosed.

The security environment is permanently changing. A national set of risks has increased after joining the EU and NATO and EU enlargement. The Czech Republic is obligated to integrate national security capabilities into NATO and the EU. To fulfil its responsibility, the Czech Republic ought to use the capabilities-based planning for further transformation of national security sector. This NATO concept ought to be in use not only within the MoD, but also at other ministries tied or responsible for national security. The national security sector must be planed, programmed, budgeted and transformed like a body. The article deals with the problem of unifying security concepts across Czech public administration. The author points out that our operational capabilities are influenced among others by the lack of labour force at the Czech national labour market.

Africa has became synonymous with conflict, increasingly violent and protracted. The continent is facing huge difficulties today and the EU is more and more involved in peace enforcement and expeditionary operations. Therefore the purpose of this article is to inform and pass knowledge of operational environment to those Czech soldiers designated to deploy overseas and abroad. It covers topics such as operational areas, understanding EU Battle Group operational Environment and Africa's operational environment. It is necessary for Czech soldiers to understand African operational environment very quickly and profoundly to avoid unfortunate misunderstanding of the local culture, customs, believes, religions, regional official and customary laws. It is a new challenge for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to be prepared for the CZE/SVK Battle Group. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

This article begins with a theoretical discussion of the culminating point, for both the attack and defence. Key definitions and related concepts provided in Carl von Clausewitz's On War, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, are discussed in detail. These sources provide many of the factors that can cause a force to reach culmination, and serve as a basis for understanding the difficulties involved in trying to determine the time and place of culmination. Other current factors attributing to culmination are discussed, and recommendations are offered to help operational commanders and planners to zero in on this elusive point. It is of the utmost importance that one's own, and the enemy's culminating point be identified with the highest possible degree of accuracy during the planning phase of a major operation or campaign.

The autor responds to several articles published in our Military Review, namely by Prof. František Ochrana, Prof. František Božek, Brigadier Rudolf Urban, Prof. Miroslav Krč, in No. 4/2008, with special appreciation to critical articles by Ing. Jiří Dušek and Lt.Col. Ing František Růžička in the same issue. He tries to find out common denominators of those essays. There are three of them: economization tied with rationalization, risk management, and information compatibility. As necessary he regards to unite those denominators both at the level of decision making officials and at the level of their subordinated elements, by means of e.g. working teams as a guarantee of coordination, so that the adopted Long-term Vision of Defence Department could be actually realized.