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The article shows that Czech armed forces are supposed to develop planning mechanism according to the Alliance Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) to be fully interoperable in operation planning process (OPP), namely in field operations planning in the framework of the multinational missions abroad. However, some problems persist at the operational level of crisis management, such as institutional arrangements for planning and commanding crisis operations, procedures pertaining to force generation, synchronization and activities coordination. The Czech Army Operational Planning Doctrine is still being developed. The purpose of this article is to inform on current state of affairs in operational planning with subsequent consequences to the results and reform recommendations by the White Paper on Defence.

The paper deals with the issue of the purpose, creation and practical use of scenarios during operational concepts development. The scenar- ios reflect the fundamental characteristics of the environment in which the military missions will be conducted in the next 15-20 years. The paper defines the type of scenarios useful for creation of operational concepts and requirements that must be met for a successful process of scenarios development. Further, it describes the process of scenarios development, the main risks associated with this process while suggesting the possibility of reducing the rate of those risks.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

The article informs about the state service of professional soldiers in the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. It compares the state service of professional soldiers in both countries mentioned and analyses the changes that took place in the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic on January 1, 2016. With reference to the state service it deals with the career of professional soldiers in the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. It offers the list of current career courses in the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. It analyses and compares the career courses designed for officers of both countries.

Operations by Lt.Col. Ing. Jaroslav Moravčík. NATO's current operational experience and that from other operations indicates that purely military actions cannot resolve a complex emergency of crisis. The requirement for the military to interact with non-military actors shows a new, more comprehensive approach. In response, NATO's Effect-Based Approach to Operations was highlighted. The four functions of EBAO and their related activities are mutually supportive. The functions are carried out in a continuous, interactive, parallel process and should not be regarded as sequential steps. They are as follows: Knowledge development; Effect-based planning; Effect-based execution; and Engagement space assessment. EBAO recognizes the importance of applying the various instruments available to the Alliance to create overall effects that will lead to crisis resolution. Achieving synergies amongst NATO and non-NATO actors will enable to identify better how it may best harmonize its contribution with other actors involved in a crisis.

The purpose of this article is to deal with Course of Actions development (COA). Attention is paid to ensure a common understanding of COA process. The article broadens the vision and offers deep insights for its readers. Moreover, the war game was described as a method of refining or modifying the COA. It has also been emphasized the commander and staff consider each COA advantages and disadvantages. The Czech Army personnel training and preparation should steadily and deliberately bring improvements into the field of operational planning capability within forces´ command levels. In order to improve operational planning knowledge, it is recommended to study AJP-5 Operational Planning Doctrine and ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.

There are two great interpreters of the Napoleonic experience, Jomini and Clausewitz. Both were interested in the application of military force to achieve political goals. The article familiarizes readers with Jomini's theoretical fundamentals of operational design elements, namely the lines of operations. Jomini left a great mark on the details of strategic planning: campaign planning, the selection of the theatre of operation, the base of operation, the line of operation, and decisive points. At the end of this process of selection was the final deployment for the decisive battle. Jomini's major contribution, then, was to provide the geometry of the battle space. In his investigation of the nature of war he developed several key operational concepts. As an operational art tools they help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept of operational lines is evolved in all operational functions in terms of ongoing military missions.

The defence environment is complex and dynamic. This is a result of the nature of modern conflict, rapid changes in technology, the need to deal with uncertainty in the face of limited sources, changed attitudes to risk and the sheer diversity of actors from different cultural backgrounds. Defence-decision makers are confronted with an increasing operational complexity that has strategic implications. Decisions on defence policy and strategy are characterized by uncertainty and risks. This Article describes differences in Hard and Soft Operational Analyses, and presents some examples and conclusions for military practice.

The Security System of the Czech Republic has gradually profiled since 1998 to the shape as it is generally defined and described in the final part of the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (2015). The article is contemplation over some possibilities to further improvement of the system in terms of the current state and challenges arising from developments in the security environment and in terms of options, how to adequately respond to them.

The objective of this article is to answer the question to which extent a respective concentration on Alliance approaches is really indispensable. A substance of the answer is to be found in the outcomes of analysis made on defence planning processes of NATO nations and EU member states. This analysis indicates to which extent national planning processes correlate with principles of NDPP and EU capability development. The analysis outcomes point out a significant diversity of approaches to national defence planning processes, the fact which stems from different interests of their national security and defence policies and, at the same time, the outcomes substantiate that the centre of gravity of national approaches does not lean on implementing principles of NDPP but on achieving outputs of the NDPP.

The aim of the article is to bring inspiration and offer needed recommendations for implementing the scenarios in the defence planning process. The article addresses purpose, development and practical application of scenarios in a national defence planning process, utilizing capability based planning (National Capability Based Defence Planning - NCBDP). During the planning scenarios are used for identification and verification of capability requirements. Scenarios depict main features of the environment in which the armed forces will be employed to execute military missions. Scenarios reflect as well operational concepts in a sense of doctrinal use of armed forces. Furthermore, they offer a possibility to identify and quantify required capabilities in a volatile, difficult to predict, complex, permanently and dynamically changing environment, and reduce level of uncertainty and associated risks. In this regard, scenarios are significant analytical and supporting tool of defence planning with high value added. Correct application of scenarios allows defining a set of required capabilities necessary for success in potential future conflicts. Scenarios enable long-term planning of capabilities development and optimisation as a platform for qualified and well informed decisions at the MoD level on the armed forces character, structure and size with regard to the ambitions and international commitments of the country. In the conclusion the article brings recommendations for the defence planning process improvement by exploiting capability based planning and scenarios. Recommendations provided in the article include doctrinal changes, organizational changes within MoD and General staff, recommendations for updating the education plans for military personnel, recommendations for optimization of the defence planning process as well as for necessary changes in the approach of the defence managers and military leaders to the described method.

The paper deals with the task forces in two levels. The first - a declaration of possibilities of the Czech Armed Forces resources in the operations. The second one - a grouping of recourses established to fulfil a special task, which is not possible to be solved by organic or reinforced unit. The paper gives an opinion on the concept of "combat team". Further, the article deals with possibilities of cooperation of tracked and wheeled combat vehicles while performing tactical tasks. In this part of the article authors deals with general eventuality of tracked and wheeled combat vehicles cooperation and the possibility of performing the units tasks in atypical numbers, including the possibility of using parachute on combat vehicles. The article contains the outcomes of the experiment exercise.

The article presents possible approaches to solve problems of finding the optimum state of tactical activities within the level of small Engineer Units. The intention is, by elaborating of the partial engineer goal which is focussed on the area of engineer units' tactics, to develop input data/ information needed for further development of mathematical models of the tactical activities. Subsequently, with the judgement on modelling outputs (applicability within C2 activities of staffs' task force structures) from engineer unit tactics point of view, the article contributes to enhancing all of C2 processes effectiveness. The article also provides us with information about the range of facts relative with problems of selected engineer unit (counter-mobility task forces) deployment planning, and controlling. There can be also found inventory of activities appropriate for optimization.

The article discusses the operational adaptability, which will be needed, in accordance with US, in future armed conflicts. The capability of operational adaptability has a significant impact particularly on the operations of land forces, which are still considered as a paramount military power. One of the prerequisites for achieving operational adaptability is effective influencing the dynamics of the human environment in armed conflict. Current development and emphasizing technology over the course of armed conflict detached too fare the War from its intangible political, cultural and psychological context. Human, psychological, political and cultural dimensions of armed conflict create a lot of uncertainty, which land forces should deal with in the future military operations. A partial solution applicable for Czech Armed Forces also outlines this article.

The fundamentals of this concept, as they were explained in previous Military Review No 1, 2011, have stayed unchanged, up to the present. There still exist operational bases, directions, courses, lines, upon which military convoys transfer by the plan or in disorderly manner. Such picture corresponds to linear wars of first, second and third generations. The wars of fourth generation are characterized by the speed and initiative. The frontiers between war and politics are blurred, so are between civilians and combatants. They are mostly wars with and among non-state actors, counter-insurgency operations (COIN) Based on doctrinal analysis; author describes concepts philosophy in functional and logical aspects. This might help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept might be successfully applied in connection with stability and COIN operations.

In conclusion of article in Military Review No 3, 2011, the authors gave notice about a sequel to this article. Today they describe military deception form another point of vies. They depict the creation of false picture, deception in the frame of operational planning. The authors accentuate that not only Asian countries, but also western ones look back to classical works on military art, e.g. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (around 2,000 years ago). Sun Tzu's philosophy recommended a strategic method to win that rarely required actual war. Spies, diplomats, deception, and a correctly organised internal structure were his main tools. If it came to war, he recommended among others to use detailed and elaborated military deception.

Presented analysis of interviews with officers at various level of command from 2004 - 2008 is aimed on their view of the process of command. On the basis of qualitative research we consider the recent way of command of the Czech officers intuitive and individual. It characterizes most common way to command, based just on experience. We consider differentiation in the way of leading and motivation of subordinates among types of forces and military specializations. The reflection of the professionalization, the training system, the perception of learned/natural ability to command and their career is offered to discussion in the context of changes in direction of education of Czech officers and commanders.

This article contains main ideas from the essay by James J. Wirtz published in anthology Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, Frank Cass 2003. This theory is a unifying explanation of why states, for example, attempt to surprise their opponents with diplomatic or military initiatives. Surprise often is described as a force multiplier; something that increases the effectiveness of one's forces in combat. The prospect of surprise can prompt political leaders of the weaker side to believe that they can nullify that disparity and achieve their objectives. In other words, if strong parties began to view conflict from the weaker party's perspective, while weak actors kept war's dialectic in mind, then surprise would become less likely. The theory of surprise can identify when it is likely to occur, who is likely to find the element of surprise attractive as a basis of policy or strategy, and who is likely to be its victim. The trick now lies in making operational use of the theory of surprise.

Russia's actions in the Ukraine have changed the security situation in the Baltic region, which makes NATO's long-term presence in Latvia essential for the Latvian Republic. The impacts of Russian actions on Latvian defence policy are discussed in the paper by Mr Janis Berzinš,Managing Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Research, National Defence Academy of Latvia, in Policy Paper, No. 2, 2014. It is a new way of intervention, new-generation warfare, without the employment of armed combats, using mostly influence and coercion, by means of covert operations. Abridged and adapted. The original English text is available at http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx. Even though the study came into being in April 2014, the editors regard it worthy to be published, being timeless and with general validity.

Islamist territorially anchored violent non-state actors (ITAVNSAs) seeking to change the status quo of the current international system constitute one of the greatest challenges the international order based on mutual respect of equal sovereign states. These actors in areas without the presence of power states use explicit cross-border violence to achieve their objective in accordance with universal Islamist ideology - the construction of a caliphate. The paper presents in the theoretical and modern historical perspectives methods of reduction of anarchy in the international system - power, economic, legalistic and normative - and highlights the reasons why face to face of these actors, these heretofore functional ways, be it on a regional or system level of analysis, fail.

There are no military conflicts without deception, as it is among others a very cheap method how to contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. Military deception (MILDEC) is applicable across a wide range of military operations. MILDEC can be conducted during all phases of military operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. According to he author, the operational deception is to be explained in more detail, basic rules are to be outlined, including fundamental principles and methods of deception for operational planning.

All-inclusive attitude of NATO forces assumes that conflict can't be solved only by military means. This shift from purely soldierly level to political brought around numbers of Alliance activities at Strategical and Operational Commands. The common denominator was the philosophy of complex approach in operational thinking, planning, and implementing NATO activities. As a result the operational SACEUR's directive GOP was substituted by its revised successor-the so-called Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). It is going to be introduced in 2011 and will influence groups and military persons at all levels of warfare, dealing with operational planning and operational art for art's sake. The article familiarizes readers with this directive (COPD) as a tool for comprehensive approach to operations. The COPD offers more deliberate and inclusive planning procedures that allow for both military and non-military actors broader understanding of operational environment and better cooperation in their common effort.

The article explains defence planning of armed forces deployment that ought to by the base for all long haul visions and concept texts for army development and its operational employment. Operational scenarios and concepts form together key elements of defence planning process, both factors enable to military organizations not only to identify future security challenges but also to react to challenges in being. It is not contrary to the so-called capability planning process as this is a manly armed force potential backing our ability to face threads and risks in the future. The example of the United States involved in three asymmetric conflicts is a warning example showing the necessity of the complex and coordinated strategical approaches.

Career education of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) personnel is a key component to meet requirements for qualifications. As these requirements are career growth conditions for career personnel, they are inherently connected with further promotion in rank. The MoD Concept of Personnel Development for 2012-2018 sets the direction of the educational development to achieve these qualification requirements. During the process of preparation of the career courses it was revealed that some system changes should be made due to implemented or planned changes within the legislative and source framework of the Ministry of Defence.This article describes the proposal of a new concept for training of personnel in the career courses. It was prepared by a project team headed by the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies at the Defence University. The article also shows the development of the situation since 2004, when the professionalization of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic occurred.

The career education of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) personnel is a key component to meet requirements for qualifications. As these requirements are career growth conditions for career personnel, they are inherently connected with further promotion in rank. During the process of preparation of the career courses it was revealed that some system changes should be made due to implemented or planned changes within the legislative and source framework of the Ministry of Defence. This article describes the implementation process of a new policy for training personnel in the career courses. It was prepared by a project team headed by the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies at the Defence University. Furthermore, the article deals with the clarification of the approach to the development of educational documentation and the chosen form of organization and conduction of military career courses. Also, a quality control system and a collection of information needed for upgrading of the senior officers career education curricula are described.

The life and work of General Dr. Milan Rastislav Štefánik is without doubts the life and work of one of the three leading crisis managers of extraordinary skills operating in an enviroment of first escalating global crisis of the 20th century. The phenomenal result of their activivities was the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic. The author concludes that Štefánik´s work is timeless, from which we ought to draw a continual inspiration.