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It is not too often we could meet such a comprehensive monograph, dealing with security problems. Among such books belongs a book by Jan Eichler, with the same title, published by Charles University Prague, 2007. The most relevant chapter, Wars waged by the U.S. and its allies after the start of global terrorism, offers a provocative question, whether democratic nations, indirectly and unintentionally, gave rise to the upsurge of antipathy amongst the states with different political constitution, resulting in acts of terror? The ambiguous assessments of American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq seem to support author?s view. According to the reviewer, dr. A. Rašek, the author is wrong about the role land forces after the RMA?Revolution in Military Affairs. Without ground forces we are not able to win today?s asymmetrical warfare. The large part of book deals with conflicts not very familiar in the Czech Republic: Ethiopian-Eritrean war, disturbances in Somalia (operation Restore Hope), Burundi, Rwanda, Congo, Sierra Leone, Srí Lanka, Cashmere, Nepal, Haiti, Bolivia, and Colombia.

The ACR is going to take part in expeditionary operations abroad, so we must be prepared to supply and sustain such forces. Problems with the provision of the bakery products in the military operation and mission include diet; economical, technological, safety; and psychosocial aspects. The ground forces are to be effective. Now we are developing premixes that meet the conditions of nutritional content of bakery products and the indigenous products with the protective function. The new utilized technology is based on preparing dough with improvers. Cost analysis of producing bread and pastry in operation was carried out with a surprising outcome: the costs of our own production are approximately 4-6 times lower than the costs of products from the local or other producers or participating armies (which is contrary to present-day official policy buying from outside suppliers).

This article illustrates the troubles encountered with development of the NRF. The NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special operations forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. The NRF is intended to be a transformational force that will not only be able to meet the security needs of NATO in 21st century but also serve as an agent of change whereby all the member nations of NATO will be able to bring capabilities, and concepts of operations into their national forces. Undoubtedly, the NRF will not provide a basis for solving all of complex challenges. But it does offer an opportunity for experimentation and testing-the essence of military transformation-and the forging of creative solutions. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of NATO or EU.

The primary purpose for NATO enlargement, covering first three countries of the so-called Visegrad Four and later Slovakia, was the necessity to fulfil "security vacuum" in Central and subsequently in Eastern Europe which came into existence after the fall of Soviet empire. Membership of those countries helped to fix criteria for admission of other states to the Alliance. Today, the NATO alliance stands in front of new important challenge: to work out a New Strategic Concept agreement in late 2010, based upon the idea saying that the security of Euro-Atlantic region is tied with and depends on the safety of the whole world. This safety concept will able to be realized only by means of global strategical governance. More then predicting expected security and defence ideas, the author reopens a broader discussion about the real meaning of NATO membership. He also repeats and enumerates risks and threats we are facing today.

The proponents of Revolution in Military Affairs claim that modern military technology will lift a "fog of war". In this article the term "fog of war" is described and illustrated in a work of Carl von Clausewitz who is supposed to introduce this term, used also in the famous novel War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. These classics show us that uncertainty and chance, in other words fogs of war, are essential to human mentality. They will be present as long as war remains within a scope human endeavour. Emphasizing that military technology is equal to lifting the "fog of war" can lead to situation in which only trained commanders are supposed be able perfectly address problems in "chessboard" of war or computer simulators, but they will unable to manage a real world full of chaos, as they not used to count with uncertainties.

It is an age-old problem, how to identify someone or something, to prevent from incidents, in which friendly forces fire on their own troops or vehicles by mistake, because of tiredness, exhaustion, psychological stress, technological defects, unforeseen circumstances, etc. Although there exists a technology carried specifically in an aircraft, combat vehicles, that utilizes coded radio signals to identify other friendly units, adopted measures are not always successful. In NATO, we have standardized systems for such identification: BTID-Battlefield Target Identification Device (for identification of vehicles and helicopters, STANAG 4579); and DSID-Dismounted Soldier Identification Device (for identification soldiers, STANAG 4630). At present, Germany (together with the United States) is in the lead of development system IFF. Systems are conceptually, technologically and tactically synthesized into ZEFF (ZielErkennung Freund-Feind), common for vehicles, helicopters, soldiers, as well as vehicles beyond the area of forces deployment. Source: Europäische Sicherheit magazine, 4/2006.

The Engineers are specialist soldiers trained in the construction and demolition of bridges, field fortifications, obstacles, roads, etc. Their major task is to support Czech missions abroad, as a part of multinational peacekeeping forces. This article is a preliminary study into the current state of applying the Czech Engineer units in operations other than war as a part of Joint Forces Peace Support Operations. There are mentioned some aspects, for example basic engineer support tasks, possible demanded future capabilities of the Czech Engineer Troops, engineer support to movement and force protection engineering. The purpose of this article is to initiate a debate about the topic and to start the brainstorming process in a broad military environment.

This work consists of analysis of differences in chain of command, tactics, weaponry and equipment used by Russian Army during the first and the second Chechen war. Main theme is searching for the answer to what degree were Russian generals able to learn from their own tragic mistakes, being done in the first war, and what are the main reasons of Russian relative success in the second. In simplification, the key factors are as follows: new joint command, at the beginning delegated to the Ministry of Defence; detailed planning of combat operations; and respect to enemy combat abilities. In addition: increased effectiveness of Russian ground forces, artillery and air force cooperation, massive deployment of new weapon systems such as Precisely Guided Ammunition and ammunition with Thermobaric effect, last but not least rather unusual effort of the Russian Army to minimize human casualties of its own forces. The reasons mentioned above with many others lead us to the conclusion that Russia is bound for a military victory in Chechnya, nevertheless a long journey remains to be covered.

Israeli Defence Forces currently evaluates information collected during recent fighting in Lebanon. Although the war was assessed as successful, there are some deficiencies that are to be improved. (a) Aviation and air defence systems. Israel is prepared against ballistic missiles, it was not prepared against short distance ones. Attack helicopters AH-64 were for the first time deployed for tactical (close) combat support of ground forces. One of them crashed down, other two collided in the air; (b) Armour. Also Israel's Merkava Mk4 was used for the first time in combat. More than 50 of the 350 Merkava Mk2, 3 and 4 tanks used in the military operations in Lebanon were damaged by Hezbollah, resulting in the death of 23 crewmen. During the last year the IDF was constantly engaged in high-intensity urban counterterrorist warfare. The regular forces, including tank crews, were retrained for small unit infantry policing activities. As a result, among others, several tanks lost tracks due to driver's inexperience. The article widely drew from several reputable magazines and reviews: Aviation Week, No. 12/2006, Jane's Defence Weekly, No. 41/2006, Defense News, No. 38, 39/2006.

Space warfare is combat that takes place in outer space. Technically as a distinct classification, it refers to battles where the targets themselves are in space. Space warfare therefore includes ground-to-space warfare, such as attacking satellites from the Earth, as well as space-tospace warfare, such as satellites attacking satellites. It does not include space-to-ground warfare, where orbital objects attack ground, sea or air targets directly, or the use of satellites for espionage, surveillance, or military communications. Both the Soviets and the United States developed antisatellite weaponry designed to shoot down satellites. While early efforts paralleled other space-to-space warfare concepts, the United States was able in the 1980s to develop ground-to-space laser antisatellite weapons. China tested a ballistic missilelaunched antisatellite weapon in January 2007. So, the US has to evaluate its defensive options in outer space as strategic stakes are higher than ever, as the vulnerability of commercial and military satellites of the US and its allies is now on display after China destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite using an antisatellite weapon.

Africa has became synonymous with conflict, increasingly violent and protracted. The continent is facing huge difficulties today and the EU is more and more involved in peace enforcement and expeditionary operations. Therefore the purpose of this article is to inform and pass knowledge of operational environment to those Czech soldiers designated to deploy overseas and abroad. It covers topics such as operational areas, understanding EU Battle Group operational Environment and Africa's operational environment. It is necessary for Czech soldiers to understand African operational environment very quickly and profoundly to avoid unfortunate misunderstanding of the local culture, customs, believes, religions, regional official and customary laws. It is a new challenge for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to be prepared for the CZE/SVK Battle Group. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

This article covers the EUFOR RD Congo operation preparation phase and provides information on Military Strategic Planning Process, Military Operational Planning, Collaborative Planning, EU OHQ Potsdam activation and Force Generation Process. It describes planning period to highlight a pivotal role of training and education. Operation EUFOR RD CONGO was the EU second military intervention in the RDC, following Operation Artemis in 2003. The EUFOR RD CONGO mission was to support MONUC during running election process, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1671, authorizing the temporary deployment of an EU force in the RDC. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech MoD. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The SALT agreements seem to be outdated, nonetheless the current discussion on the U.S. missile defence systems must be perceived in its complexity and theoretical framework, with AMB treaty as a cornerstone. The article suggests that ABM treaty and Interim Agreement, forming together the outcome of SALT negotiations, demonstrate that rational decisions are fully compatible with arms control system and realist approaches to the international relations. The author supposes that cooperation and mutual trust can be achieved through negotiations and perception of other participants. He also takes into account the impact of Soviet nuclear build-up in 1960s is and its consequences. The important conclusion can be derived from this fact: arms control should be expected more in times of military balance rather that the domination of one world's actor. Key words: disarmament, arms control, mutual assured destruction, and antiballistic missile systems.

To fulfil Czech obligation as an EU Battle Group Framework Nation according to the regulating document EU BG Training and Certification, the Czech Army is to certify that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU meet the standards and criteria stated in Standards and Criteria for EU BG. It is recommended that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU certification process should be analogous with NATO Response Force (NRF) certification procedure and practical methods. Further it is suggested that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU certification procedure is divided into several evaluation procedures: preparation planning evaluation, war-fighting evaluation, and technical evaluation. Each procedure will be developed by specialized teams with representatives in the sub-working group to ensure that the different procedures harmonize. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources. The written sources are listed in the matrix above.

Factors such as distance, destination, deployment demands, duration, represent key elements to determine logistics requirements. The EU BG concept necessitates considerable strategic air/sea lift and combat support capabilities, since EU battle groups are to be able to be deployed almost anywhere in the world, primarily in Africa. They have to deploy both troops and materiel simultaneously to its mission areas. Strategic airlift is the fastest way of deploying troops over long distance. The main challenge for the EU is therefore availability giant airplanes. A lack of suitable European transport crafts in EBalabáuropean airlift fleet is the Achilles heel to the EU BG Concept. The problem is that all aircraft available have only limited payload capacities and flying range. Although deploying by sea is more time consuming than deploying by air, EU member states have more ships available for strategic sea transport. The strict deployment deadline set down in the EU BG Concept means that ships and crews will have to be held at very high readiness.

This operation was led by Germany, and made up of elements contributed by twenty EU nations; as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The EU deployed FHQ in Kinshasa and simultaneously kept the over-the-horizon force in Gabon, in order to ensure a deterrent capacity and to avoid unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa. After Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR RD Congo was a second EU largest military operation, involving a total of almost 3,000 soldiers and officers). The co-operation with MONUC was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. The operation demonstrated the EU ability to successfully conduct medium scale autonomous multinational operations within a planned time frame under the UN mandate. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The professional base for tactical and operational levels of US ground forces and German Federal Armed Forces are the following manuals: US Army Field Manual 100/5 "Operations", since 2001 being labelled as "Field Manual 3-0", and German HDv 100/100 "Truppenfuhrung 2000". Both manuals were drafted in a closed cooperation. The basic principles of German manual Truppenfuhrung 2000 were imitated and copied by the Netherlands armed forces and partly, to a certain measure, also by other NATO nations. Rules of Field Manual 3-0 were tested in peace operations, in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan and during the first phase of Second War in Iraq. In fact, the operations of US forces indirectly proved practicability and effectiveness of nearly identical German field rules and manuals, consequently command principles, including those of the so-called nation building. Based upon an article by MG Christian E.O. Millotat in 3/2006 Osterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, No 3/2006.

In our forces, similarly like in those of Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania, we assess the scope of damages in numbers showing overall labour needed for repair, necessary for restoration complete combat capacity. Now we put into test another method, by means of the so-called S-M-C-A code (Shoot, Mobility, Communication, Armour); e.g. numbers 0-0-0-0 represent fully combat-ready main battle tank, whereas 0-4-0-4 shows immobile armoured vehicle, with perforated armour. To adapt commanders? decisionmaking process and introduce this method into forces, mechanised units, up the battalion level, we perform exercises on ModSAF trainer (Modular Semi-Automated Forces). This method enables us to plan the application of military repair depots, fully recover combat potential of military vehicles as soon as possible. Nowadays, ModSAF methodology is successfully exploited in the Centre for Simulation Technologies in Brno and Vyškov. The Army of the Czech Republic stands at the very same place as modern forces of Alliance, the US, Great Britain, Germany and others, in the 90?s of the last century.

Wastes resulted from military exercise and their negative influences are imminent risks for our environment. To eliminate this, first we have to make the classification of wastes and secondly their index evaluation. The indexing can frame negative potential influence of wastes even before actual start of the exercise, so that we can evaluate negative impacts and arrange preventive measures beforehand. With using tablets and charts, the article depicts the process of classification and index appraisal of wastes, originating during military exercise. The method is being developed at the Defence University in Brno and was presented in front of Environmental Training Working Group (NTG/ ASG) and consulted with individual representative of Alliance nations. However Hazard Impact Index method is developed for testing purpose within a mechanised company of the Czech Ground Forces, ACR. Another step is the creation of algorithm for the conversion of index values for higher organic units and levels of the Army of the Czech Republic.

Terrorism threatens to attack and destroy the open democracy, but what is terrorism? The main aim of this essay is to formulate some proposals of a minimal operational definition tied with terrorism, as well as a definition of terrorist attack with the ambition to surpass a possibility of an ambiguous construction in the field of semantical research. Terrorism is usually described as unlawful violent activism targeted against civilians or against civilian targets with the aim of achieving political, religious, ideological and other goals. It presents wellconsidered ways of production and fructification of fear that are applied on civilian targets. A terrorist attack communicates devastatingly as a pure act of violence inside the psychosomatic structure of its recipients (victims). The new terrorism after 9/11 attacks could be characterized by fanaticism and the impending danger of arms of mass destruction. It is a culture of death.

The author of this article considers the prospective changes in the development, character, missions and tasks of the Army of the Czech Republic, Those changes are deduced from the changing security environment and long-term development trends. To meet new demands, we must continue in building interoperability and compatibility. The battlefield operations will be planned and controlled by the systems of "Network Centric Warfare" and "Reach Back Operations". It will not be necessary for a commander to be in physical contact with operational theatre. Electronical high speed intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance will enable the high pace of military operations (together with common analyses, integration of collected data, evaluation of enemy's intents and activities). This will enable to build a credible defence, in the frame of collective security system, hand in hand with other NATO allies.

Armed Forces by František Kříž. After September 2001, in operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq, great attention is paid to terrorism throughout the war. In fact, new generation of warfare came in existence. War on terrorism is a large-scale low intensity conflict, without classical confrontations between states, without massive bulk of soldiers. For such type of warfare we can't use weapons of mass destruction, or classical types of warfare. At level of US Army brigade there were some changes in structure and scope of forces. Several new formations were established: Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, and Future Combat System Brigade Combat Teams. In operations, brigade S2 section is reinforced by an analysis and integration platoon, MI Company. The idea of augmentations and reorganizations of S2 groups is to elevate potential in the brigade system of Intelligence Battlefield Operating System. Article is based on articles form Military News, Military Intelligence, Global Security, etc.

In the early 21st century defence research can be discussed in two ways: we can stay either within existing discipline "theory of state defence", or we can set up new academic specialization concentrating more on the notion "security" and its individual aspects, including their inner ties. In the former case, there are spheres in which civil and military experts can complement each other, whereas other spheres of studies ought to stay exclusively in the domain of military experts. Mutual cooperation between civilian and military experts can be concentrated on systematic studies of security threats, predictions of potential conflicts, analyses of security cooperation between the Czech Republic and NATO, the EU and the OSCE, economy support of state defence. On the contrary, military specialist ought to focus on e.g. major regional conflicts, low intensity conflicts, military operations other than war. As the term "security science" is not used in NATO nations, the author suggests, it would be more useful to preserve academic discipline "defence theory" to make full use of military experts.