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This article covers the EUFOR RD Congo operation preparation phase and provides information on Military Strategic Planning Process, Military Operational Planning, Collaborative Planning, EU OHQ Potsdam activation and Force Generation Process. It describes planning period to highlight a pivotal role of training and education. Operation EUFOR RD CONGO was the EU second military intervention in the RDC, following Operation Artemis in 2003. The EUFOR RD CONGO mission was to support MONUC during running election process, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1671, authorizing the temporary deployment of an EU force in the RDC. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech MoD. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

This article deals with the problem of theoretical base of reflective teaching methods and illustrates practical examples and recommendations of experienced language teachers. In detail it explains the structure and principles of this educational concept, and defines differences from regular teaching methods. The authoress explains both teaching and learning through critical reflection practice, how to develop critically engaged learners. She explains how to gather information on students in class in charge, and enumerates questions to be answered. Reflective thinking by means of feedback enriches both students and teachers. "Reflective" teachers are able to monitor, criticize and defend their own activities, planning, implementation and assessment language programmes and instructions. fl

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

Intelligence activity is an essential part of psychological operations (PSYOPS). Intelligence data are collected, treated, and assessed by intelligence officers together with analytical specialists in cooperation with intelligence authorities from other services. Two basic documents are made. First, in British Army, it is called Country Area Study; in US forces it is labelled as PSYOP Basic Study. The second type of studies represents the assessment of target audience, called in British Army Basic Psychological Study, in US Special PSYOP Assessment. Gathered information are integrated into special electronic bases, e.g. SOCRATES (Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis and Threat Evaluation Data System), or POADS (Psychological Operations Automated Data System) used by the US Army. The rating of effectiveness of psychological campaigns is extremely difficult and consists of several phases. Even enemy's propaganda is analyzed. This process is of specific structure, categorized as SCAME (Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effect). For PSYOPS operations is extreme important their precise timing. Legal Aspects of "Consciousness and Religion"

The author of this article considers the prospective changes in the development, character, missions and tasks of the Army of the Czech Republic, Those changes are deduced from the changing security environment and long-term development trends. To meet new demands, we must continue in building interoperability and compatibility. The battlefield operations will be planned and controlled by the systems of "Network Centric Warfare" and "Reach Back Operations". It will not be necessary for a commander to be in physical contact with operational theatre. Electronical high speed intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance will enable the high pace of military operations (together with common analyses, integration of collected data, evaluation of enemy's intents and activities). This will enable to build a credible defence, in the frame of collective security system, hand in hand with other NATO allies.

The Centres of Gravity (COG) are characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. The COG belongs among the most important operational concepts. It is the main source of power and strength. Without dermining enemy's COG we are not able to carry out any quick and resolute action, to reach ordered tasks, desired objectives. The primary purpose of this article is to offer basic information about this subject. This first part is concentrated predominantly to Carl von Clausewitz's ideas. The article especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the COG theory in confrontation with contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. It highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

This operation was led by Germany, and made up of elements contributed by twenty EU nations; as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The EU deployed FHQ in Kinshasa and simultaneously kept the over-the-horizon force in Gabon, in order to ensure a deterrent capacity and to avoid unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa. After Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR RD Congo was a second EU largest military operation, involving a total of almost 3,000 soldiers and officers). The co-operation with MONUC was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. The operation demonstrated the EU ability to successfully conduct medium scale autonomous multinational operations within a planned time frame under the UN mandate. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

This article deals with the EU command and control functions and provides basic information on the structure and capabilities of the EU CCS in Battle Group EU operations. The author describes political and strategical levels CCS (COREPER, GAERC, COPS, CivCom, EUMC, EUMS, BDE HQ, prospective EU FHQ). Only US, EU and E3 (Britain, France, Germany) are capable to realize integrated expeditional operations. The ACR can work only with cooperation with them. The Czech Republic as a small EU member state is actively engaged in the building of the Battle Group EU. The Czech Army is going to increase its expeditionary capabilities as demanded and be prepared for a broader range of conflicts and crises in the vital area of the EU concerns. At present, the ACR is able to carry out a self-supported, integrated expedition operation only on the edge of all its strength. The political leaders must bear this fact in mind, as the army mustn't be overburdened, otherwise it might lose its credibility. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Anti-ballistic missiles are missiles designed to counter enemy's ballistic missiles. First, the author compares strategic patterns reflecting various eras of the former bipolar world. Their mutual balance of that time could be described as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). As long as MAD was a fact of life, the ABM Treaty fulfilled its important function as a cornerstone of strategic stability. Keeping nuclear arsenals at a level which is not even justifiable is selfcontradictory, as the military strategy and targeting policy is based on the capability of the other side, not on its intentions. Today's Russian policy is shaped by the status-driven desire to deal with the United States from a position of power-related symmetry and strategic parity, by negating the unique position of the United States. The American ballistic missile defence policy used to be also a central element of their containment strategy towards China. However, at present, Ballistic Missile Defence (BDM) sets as a top-priory the defence against the so-called rough states, rather than against Moscow or Beijing.

Antiballistic defence systems could be defined as a secondary defensive response to ballistic threats, against existing, projected or planned ballistic military hardware. In a way, it is a sort of deterrence weapon, because such defence discourages opponents form the development of offensive missiles. The author of this article, the former deputy defence minister, Maj-Gen. (ret), specifies three relevant antimissiles system: ALTBM-NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence; NATO MD-NATO Missile Defence; and USA MD-USA Missile Defence. The purpose of American antiballistic defence is to counterbalance potential strokes by limited numbers of ballistic missiles, blasted off from both enemy and rogue states and those launched by accident. Allegedly, the Iranians are developing ballistic missiles with the range of 4,000 km. With the reference to the fact that the distance Prague-Teheran is about 3,400 km, and such missiles could constitute an eminent danger even for the Czech Republic, not only for the continental United States, this issue is widely discussed in Czech mass media.

Economy of production, economies to scale, in civilian sector are quite different than economy pattern in defence sphere, as specifying the allocation of sources for the Army of the Czech Republic is not based on exact calculation of costing, payments as we could not observe the substantial terms of comparable partial and overall expenses. At present, we are not fully able to compare defence outputs, nor effecitivity of spent sources.