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China's premier intelligence services are as follows: the Ministry of Public Security (MBS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the Military Intelligence Department (MDI) of the People's Liberation Army/General Staff Department. Last but not least, the central institution of the Chinese intelligence community is the Communist Party of China (CPC) having its own intelligence and security bodies. The operational methods of the China's intelligence services are nothing new to espionage. They run aggressive surveillance and recruitment programs against visiting foreign businessmen, scholars, government officials, and scientists. It is a normal to debrief the returning Chinese delegates to determine whether useful information was acquired by simple observation. However, the MSS and military intelligence services further exploit these opportunities by co-opting a number of these travellers to carry out specific operational activities. Chinese intelligence services can count on state ministries, people's friendship societies, academic institutions, and the militaryindustrial complex to support activities such as agent recruitment and information collection as well as to provide cover jobs to their operatives. Main source: Alain Rodier, Raids, No. 234/2005 (nas).

In our forces, similarly like in those of Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania, we assess the scope of damages in numbers showing overall labour needed for repair, necessary for restoration complete combat capacity. Now we put into test another method, by means of the so-called S-M-C-A code (Shoot, Mobility, Communication, Armour); e.g. numbers 0-0-0-0 represent fully combat-ready main battle tank, whereas 0-4-0-4 shows immobile armoured vehicle, with perforated armour. To adapt commanders? decisionmaking process and introduce this method into forces, mechanised units, up the battalion level, we perform exercises on ModSAF trainer (Modular Semi-Automated Forces). This method enables us to plan the application of military repair depots, fully recover combat potential of military vehicles as soon as possible. Nowadays, ModSAF methodology is successfully exploited in the Centre for Simulation Technologies in Brno and Vyškov. The Army of the Czech Republic stands at the very same place as modern forces of Alliance, the US, Great Britain, Germany and others, in the 90?s of the last century.

In today's conflicts, such as the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat is more difficult to define; in fact, there are often multiple threats working against our forces concurrently. Our army lacks first-hand information from current battlefields, so that the author must make use of mediated experiences. The paper is therefore based upon articles from foreign military magazines, namely Intelligence Synchronization on a Nonlinear Battlefield (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 4/2004) and Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operation (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1/1997). It is not a mere translation or compilation, but ingenious summing up of discussed ideas. In this study, the author thinks over intelligence synchronization and proposes a new way of looking at it. Methodology heads from priority intelligence requirements towards specific information requirements, via indicators, and so on. The purpose of intelligence synchronization is to focus efforts to build, refine, or clarify the commander's understanding of the battlefield and the threat.

After the communist coup détat in 1948, although formally independent, the Czechoslovak army was subordinated under the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Following the year 1960, its inner life was directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), in fact by the Military Commission, headed by the First Secretary KSČ. Overall militarization of Czech society was even higher than e.g. in Poland, because in case of military conflict, our territory was supposed to play the role of main European theatre of war. In time of the so-called reform movement in the late 60's, there were some trends to release close ties with the Soviet Union, but at the same time the leading political and military authorities tried to place Soviet forces in Czech territory to strengthen Russian position in arms reduction talks with the US, so that the Soviet Union could boost its units at the borders with People's China. The author compares those events with the recent ones, after November 1989, and following processes of introducing civil control in the forces, their reduction, transformation, and professionalization. He quotes names and works of authors occupied with this theme.

In essence, the world is organizing itself in a series of interconnected networks. The information revolution will cause shifts, both in how societies may come into conflict and how their armed forces may wage war. Cyber war is coming. Its concept refers to information-related conflict both at a grand level, between nations or societies, and at low levels of international subgroups, e.g. terrorists of any kind, e.g. Al Qaeda, etc. The concept may involve public diplomacy measures, political and cultural subversion, deception or interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements across computer networks. Terrorists may build mutual connections, shape opinions in target groups, and conduct intense propaganda and psychological operations campaigns. Guerrilla warfare in cyberspace can use those networks to maximize their political, economic, and social power while minimizing the military aspects until the final offensive. The source: T. Hammes, Jane's Defence Weekly, 5/2005 (nas).

This article presents not only an non-conventional approach towards psychology of military groups, but also offers the deep insight into British way of military thinking. This article is concerned with cohesion in its broadest sense. The term cohesion is usually used to describe one of the many contributions to morale. British military doctrine says that manoeuvres approach is an approach to operation in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. The cohesion in this context is being used to describe the complex interaction of the physical, moral and conceptual components of fighting. A thorough understanding of the cohesion between people would enhance their fighting power. The good leadership is the means by which an understanding of what enables cohesion can be used to bring it about. Source: Human Cohesion; Shock and Surprise on the Battlefield (D. Rowland, D. Roney, J. Storr), British Army Review No 137, 2005.

Answering the commander's intelligence and decision needs is an uneasy task for any person responsible for intelligence. PIR information help the commander to keep knowledge on relevant environment during peacekeeping, stability and supporting operations, which are different from PIR in offensive and defensive operations. In combat operations, PIR focuses on enemy's military capability and intentions. Intelligence collection in stability and support operations may adjust to the people and their cultures, politics, religions, economics and related factors. The commander must have information telling on current enemy's threats, fighters, as well as on information ranging from standard of living of local population, supplies of electric power, to building a municipal school. Shortly, to have information behind the traditional scope of PIR. But the current Czech regulation MO/VZS 2003 does not explain similar situations, the only examples we can find are those in US Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations.