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Nowadays we use the term security in a broader sense, covering ecology environment, economic discrepancies between the North and the South, raw material sources, demography, energy. The transfer of economic power from West to East is gathering pace and soon will dramatically change the context for dealing with international challenges - as well as the challenges themselves. Many in the West are already aware of Asia?s growing strength. The author uses data e.g. from The Pentagon?s New Map to demonstrate a cutting-edge approach to globalization that combines security, economic, political, and cultural factors. He predicts and explains the nature of war and peace in the twenty-first century and outlines the role that Western world can and will play in establishing international stability. European governments need to improve their military capabilities and develop their own distinctive approach to warfare. That approach should build on core European military strengths related to post-war stabilization after a military conflict. These approaches include nation-building, peacekeeping and counter-insurgency warfare.

In the early 21st century defence research can be discussed in two ways: we can stay either within existing discipline "theory of state defence", or we can set up new academic specialization concentrating more on the notion "security" and its individual aspects, including their inner ties. In the former case, there are spheres in which civil and military experts can complement each other, whereas other spheres of studies ought to stay exclusively in the domain of military experts. Mutual cooperation between civilian and military experts can be concentrated on systematic studies of security threats, predictions of potential conflicts, analyses of security cooperation between the Czech Republic and NATO, the EU and the OSCE, economy support of state defence. On the contrary, military specialist ought to focus on e.g. major regional conflicts, low intensity conflicts, military operations other than war. As the term "security science" is not used in NATO nations, the author suggests, it would be more useful to preserve academic discipline "defence theory" to make full use of military experts.

Conventional military strategists did not hold counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare with high esteem. In fact, strategists often marginalized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discussions. But true strategic thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare consider time and space and long strategic view. Now we must consider critical areas for the global war on terrorism (GWOT), including changing nature of the threat environment. Sources: Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, by E. Cohen, Lt.Col. C. Crane, Lt.Col. J. Horvath, Lt.Col. J. Nagl; Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency by Col. J. B. Celeski in Military Review March-April 2006.

The author summarizes and consequently generalizes security histories of war, peace, military, based upon the events of the last century. Recent moves towards a common European defence and security policy and European defence capabilities have sparked off considerable debate. Concerns have been voiced that this could lead to a decoupling of Europe's security from that of its other NATO allies, or a duplication of effort or capabilities. Above all, there is an urgent need for Europe to boost its capabilities, if it is not to be confined in future to a useful, but limited, reactive defence and security role. It is expected that the US, in a medium-term outlook, to say in the 2020 horizont, will be in a position of the only world's superpower; the People's China will remain only a regional power. All prognostic considerations must be therefore deduced from the position of the United States in the world. The American policy of multilateralism has proved to be most successful in history. As far as the position of our republic is concerned, to improve our defence capabilities we must use the EU as a framework ...242

Intelligence services collect data from various sources: SIGINT (intelligence obtained by listening to the enemy's radio transmissions), HUMINT (information about the enemy obtained from people, e.g. friendly forces, agents, civilians, prisons of war), and the very latest it is the so-called OSINT - Open Sources Intelligence. Its description is not unequivocal. In the intelligence community, the term "open" refers to overt, publicly available sources, as opposed to covert or classified sources. OSINT includes a wide variety of information and sources: media, public data, observation and reporting. It is defined as produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement.

This article presents a letter of introduction for the book by the recent director of Brno Institute for Strategic Studies, Josef Janošec, "Security and Defence of the Czech Republic 2015-2025", composed together with other authors from this institute. This deed is even more rewarding owning to the fact that in our country we lack an advanced cultivation of military sciences. Since the beginning of our pre-war Republic, we've only taken over ready-made military doctrines: at first it was the French doctrine of defensive lines of fortresses and forts, after WWII it used to be the Soviet Offensive Doctrine. Only in 1968 there was an attempt to draw up Czech national military doctrine in the so-called Memorandum of Military Political Academy (a military school of university type), but after the invasion of Soviet Army in the same year all such efforts faded in vain. The book by Ing. Janošec and his team is a brave attempt to establish the starting point for our own genuine Czech security policy, based upon broadly conceived security analyses ...190

The magazine Europäische Sicherheit No. 5/2007 published the article "1st die NATO fur die Zukunft gerustet?" by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. This article summarizes his main ideas. The logic of cooperation in security is timeless. That is why NATO did not end when the Cold War ended. The security environment has changed. The Alliance's missions have little in common with the territorial defence and deterrence functions that characterized the Cold War, namely the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The need to cooperate in meeting common security challenges has not changed. The new NATO programme is very ambitious: the Alliance must broaden the forum for political consultations; military transformation must continue, we have to develop modern military capabilities, among the most important developments in this respect is the NATO Response Force, which gives NATO an entirely new rapid reaction capability. We cannot afford a two-tier Alliance with some countries doing only the peacekeeping and reconstruction and others doing the high intensity and occasionally combat operations. Solidarity and equitable burden sharing means that Allies must be willing and able to do both-and have the military forces to back up their political commitments. NATO must both cooperate with Russia and at the same time be opened to new members.

His professional career was amazing. After the WWI, as a former legionnaire with war experiences, he fought in Slovakia against invading Hungarian forces. Then he decided to reenlist, he was a company commander, regiment aide, and after graduating from War College (High War School) he was appointed as the head of intelligence department of the 2nd Division Plzeň, the chief of intelligence department of Prague District Military Command, and finally the deputy chief of intelligence department of the Main Staff. At that time, the Czech Military Intelligence hired a member of German Abwehr, Paul Thummel, the famous agent A-54. After the German occupation, he and his eleven colleagues flew to Britain, with the most important documents. There he organized intelligence operations in occupied Czech and Moravian lands, in 1944 he was promoted to the rank of brigadier. Soon after the end of WWII, the Communist Party started to prepare coup d'etat. The first step was to take over defence intelligence. Brigadier Moravec was accused of many offences before the war, and although they were not proved, he was released from the army. In 1948 he fled abroad and began to run intelligence activities under American patronage. After the Velvet Revolution in 1989 he was rehabilitated and posthumously decorated by the Order of M. R. Stefanik, one of the highest Czechoslovak orders.

The end of the Cold War was the most important factor determinating political and security realities in the world. Consequent development has gradually led to the significant reengagement of the former Warsaw Pact member states and other military alliances, especially into all form of peace operations. The Czech Republic is following the path common for the other countries in Euroatlantic region, being motivated by common struggle for enlargement this area of stability, security, democracy and peaceful resolution of crises. Hand in hand, with growing experiences from peace operations, the Czech Republic reflects specificities of national security and military strategies, as well as the level of declared military ambitions. Principal changes the Czech forces undergoing now are aiming at fulfilment basic principles of the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic. Participation of the Czech Republic in peace operations and operations outside the republic is becoming the most predominant form of deployment of our armed forces. Therefore, peace operations studies are more pressing today than ever before in the past.

Even though many activities related to intelligence and intelligence network after the end of Cold War were released and have become commonplace, classified matters are still in the centre of public's interest. In discussions, experts use various terms tied with espionage or counter-intelligence, but real differences are not too high. In the armed forces (in the frame of NATO) this question was solved by issuing the manual AJP-2, Allied Joint Intelligence, CounterIntelligence and Security Doctrine (NATO 2003). This article summarises key and basic terms used in intelligence services, including new theoretical concepts from this field. As the author writes in the introductory chapter, many experts, namely in civilian and academic fields use the same terminology, but their explanation differs. They use different definitions reflecting diverse circumstances under which they came into existence. The article was written namely as a contribution to interagency communication, among civilian and professional experts, in time when the overall security concept is changing, when military power is not the only tool to avert wide spectrum of security threats of 21st century.

This thoroughly elaborated paper deals with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Similar missions represent NATO's global interests in problems of word's security. Afghanistan is the very place where new warfare methods are tested, new ways of combat come into existence. After September 11, 2001, American administration declared the war to global terrorism - GWOT (Global War on Terror), the first theatre of GWOT became Afghanistan. From military point of view, it was unambiguous success, to a large degree, it succeeded even politically. But Afghanistan was negatively affected by the situation in Iraq. Afghanistan is far off being stabilized. Local warlords, tribal chiefs, called anti-coalition militants (ACMs), avoid regular warfare, they use raids, sabotages, acts of terror, provocations. Coalition units use e.g. PSYOP operations, as a way how to implement norms based deterrence.

New technologies influence not only social advance, but also the development of armed forces. Present-time warfare is resolute, dynamic. In the 21st century, both low and high intensity conflicts, counterterrorist or stabilization operations might take place in urbanized areas, where casualties and material damages are high. New weaponry and technology make demands on military and professional training, self-control, psychic preparedness. In advance we must set rules governing the firing of weapons and use of force namely by soldiers involved in peacekeeping and counter-insurgency situations. Mental stress, emotional, or physical strain or tension of soldiers are manifested by fanaticism, looting, killing non-combatants, desertions or going away from military units without permission (AWOLs), depressed soldiers inflict wound on themselves, they misuse drugs or alcohol. The author cites factors increasing soldiers' resistance: high cohesion of units, tough training, relaxation, courageousness, high awareness of objectives of operations and war aims.

The purpose of this article is to point out the problems of long long-lasting stay in different culture surroundings, countries being at war or undergoing post-war reconstruction. It is the question of the so-called multiculturalism, in which an observer must adapt himself to quite a different culture, or to say it better, to affiliate his life with the knowledge and values shared by another society. This empirical survey, together with collected data, is the first of its kind that was carried out in the Czech Republic. The research was done with the use of questionnaires. Even though the poll was taken among the patch of 95 respondents, its results may be extrapolated over other persons, war correspondents, humanitarian workers, diplomats, or members of church missions.

The paper deals with the assessment of extremism in connection with the Czech Armed Forces. It analyses attitudes of various forms of Czech domestic extremist movements to the military sphere and possible impacts of the infiltration of extremists into the army, namely in time of danger (training militant activities, including paramilitarism, subversion, espionage, etc). The most important problem of the contemporary Czech counter-extremist policy in this area is the rise of neo-Nazi activities in the armed forces and the establishing of extreme right paramilitary units which take interest in the engagement of soldiers. Even though these activities are limited in our country, the author offers overall survey various obscure organizations, having connections to foreign groups sponsoring their Czech counterparts.

Africa has became synonymous with conflict, increasingly violent and protracted. The continent is facing huge difficulties today and the EU is more and more involved in peace enforcement and expeditionary operations. Therefore the purpose of this article is to inform and pass knowledge of operational environment to those Czech soldiers designated to deploy overseas and abroad. It covers topics such as operational areas, understanding EU Battle Group operational Environment and Africa's operational environment. It is necessary for Czech soldiers to understand African operational environment very quickly and profoundly to avoid unfortunate misunderstanding of the local culture, customs, believes, religions, regional official and customary laws. It is a new challenge for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to be prepared for the CZE/SVK Battle Group. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Physical condition and nutritional state of soldiers were monitored among members of KFOR mission by means of anthropometrical measurement of physical changes, defined above all by the so-called Mass Body Index, metabolic exchanges, and contents of fat in a body. The evaluation was done in picked-up clusters, formed on the base of physical activities of personnel. Verifying was carried out by means of the Wilcoxon test, non-parametric statistical test for the case of two related samples or repeated measurements on a single sample. The test involves comparisons of differences between measurements; the null hypothesis is specified. The alternative hypothesis assumes clusters, different in physical characteristics, with notable statistical differences. Among other results, in 2005, 57.10 per cent of military personnel between 25-35 years were overweight.

The professional base for tactical and operational levels of US ground forces and German Federal Armed Forces are the following manuals: US Army Field Manual 100/5 "Operations", since 2001 being labelled as "Field Manual 3-0", and German HDv 100/100 "Truppenfuhrung 2000". Both manuals were drafted in a closed cooperation. The basic principles of German manual Truppenfuhrung 2000 were imitated and copied by the Netherlands armed forces and partly, to a certain measure, also by other NATO nations. Rules of Field Manual 3-0 were tested in peace operations, in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan and during the first phase of Second War in Iraq. In fact, the operations of US forces indirectly proved practicability and effectiveness of nearly identical German field rules and manuals, consequently command principles, including those of the so-called nation building. Based upon an article by MG Christian E.O. Millotat in 3/2006 Osterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, No 3/2006.

After the communist coup détat in 1948, although formally independent, the Czechoslovak army was subordinated under the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Following the year 1960, its inner life was directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), in fact by the Military Commission, headed by the First Secretary KSČ. Overall militarization of Czech society was even higher than e.g. in Poland, because in case of military conflict, our territory was supposed to play the role of main European theatre of war. In time of the so-called reform movement in the late 60's, there were some trends to release close ties with the Soviet Union, but at the same time the leading political and military authorities tried to place Soviet forces in Czech territory to strengthen Russian position in arms reduction talks with the US, so that the Soviet Union could boost its units at the borders with People's China. The author compares those events with the recent ones, after November 1989, and following processes of introducing civil control in the forces, their reduction, transformation, and professionalization. He quotes names and works of authors occupied with this theme.

For many years we have been talking about simulators/trainers. The first phase of this process ended in 1998 by publishing "The Concept of Introducing Simulation and Trainer Technology". This year, in 2005, two simulation centres, in Brno and Vyškov, are opened. We elaborated new programmes for the preparation of mechanised and armour units. In these days the Instruction Book is printed and very soon it will be distributed into respective units and institutions of ACR. The author is a strong supporter of exploiting simulators. He knows from his own experiences that the quality of training is much better and soldier's skills grow in high speed. To understand this question better, the author enumerates several time-schedules for simulator training and recommends few time-tested procedures and methods of exercises. He believes that once you try to use simulators, you will see how advantageous this method is. The simulators can be used not only for practicing combat situations, but also for operations other than war. But this theme will be treated next time.

In essence, the world is organizing itself in a series of interconnected networks. The information revolution will cause shifts, both in how societies may come into conflict and how their armed forces may wage war. Cyber war is coming. Its concept refers to information-related conflict both at a grand level, between nations or societies, and at low levels of international subgroups, e.g. terrorists of any kind, e.g. Al Qaeda, etc. The concept may involve public diplomacy measures, political and cultural subversion, deception or interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements across computer networks. Terrorists may build mutual connections, shape opinions in target groups, and conduct intense propaganda and psychological operations campaigns. Guerrilla warfare in cyberspace can use those networks to maximize their political, economic, and social power while minimizing the military aspects until the final offensive. The source: T. Hammes, Jane's Defence Weekly, 5/2005 (nas).

This new generation war could be characterized by an emphasis on nonstate actors, by political and psychological forms of attacks that directly influence opponents. Other characteristics are as follows: extensive refugee flows, violence, transnational criminal aspects. Several factors will impact the nature, frequency and character of "small wars" in the 21st century. Failed/failing states, urbanization, diffusion of actors, communications technology, technological diffusion, religion, and ultra-terrorism. Clausewitz's fundamental appreciation for the primacy of political objectives as the guiding object in war remains relevant to "small wars" as does to interstate conflicts. The problem for today's strategist or policy maker is determining exactly what has changed, how the various means of stratecraft need to be adapted to the specific contingency at hand (according to The Journal of Strategic Studies, 6/2005).

Mr. Koutný belonged among those who went through the fire of World War II and lately became victims of despotism of the so-called "class laws". In fact, Col. Koutný was not a soldier, but the journalist. At the beginning of war, Mr. Koutný was sent to Poland to inform about Polish practices to return Czechoslovak refugees back to the "Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia". At Poland he joined the Czechoslovak Military Group; lately he experienced Soviet labour camps. In a small city of Buzuluk, where the first Czechoslovak Field Battalion was formed, he became the chief of recruiting commission. There he met people returning from the NKVD's camps (i.e. Soviet Secret Police's detention camps). Many his reports to the Chief of Czechoslovak Military Mission Heliodor Pika were preserved in archives. Nowadays they bear witness on those fearful camps. As a press officer he laid down the foundation of the Czech army daily "Our Army in the USSR". He worked at the Czechoslovak Headquarters in Russia, as a liaison officer at the Command of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR, as a political and military advisor to the commander of armour brigade Lt.Col. Janko. In his liberated country he helped to establish the military publishing house Our Army (Naše vojsko). Shortly after the communist coup d'etat, in 1949, he was imprisoned. He died in a communist jail in 1960.

In today's conflicts, such as the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat is more difficult to define; in fact, there are often multiple threats working against our forces concurrently. Our army lacks first-hand information from current battlefields, so that the author must make use of mediated experiences. The paper is therefore based upon articles from foreign military magazines, namely Intelligence Synchronization on a Nonlinear Battlefield (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 4/2004) and Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operation (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1/1997). It is not a mere translation or compilation, but ingenious summing up of discussed ideas. In this study, the author thinks over intelligence synchronization and proposes a new way of looking at it. Methodology heads from priority intelligence requirements towards specific information requirements, via indicators, and so on. The purpose of intelligence synchronization is to focus efforts to build, refine, or clarify the commander's understanding of the battlefield and the threat.

Armed Forces by František Kříž. After September 2001, in operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq, great attention is paid to terrorism throughout the war. In fact, new generation of warfare came in existence. War on terrorism is a large-scale low intensity conflict, without classical confrontations between states, without massive bulk of soldiers. For such type of warfare we can't use weapons of mass destruction, or classical types of warfare. At level of US Army brigade there were some changes in structure and scope of forces. Several new formations were established: Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, and Future Combat System Brigade Combat Teams. In operations, brigade S2 section is reinforced by an analysis and integration platoon, MI Company. The idea of augmentations and reorganizations of S2 groups is to elevate potential in the brigade system of Intelligence Battlefield Operating System. Article is based on articles form Military News, Military Intelligence, Global Security, etc.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.

The conscription is a system of compulsory enrolment of men and women into the armed forces. Conscripts may be called to serve in time of peace in order to train for war; they may be called into uniform in time of emergency. Conscripts are distinguished from volunteers and professionals, as well as from mercenaries, who offer their service to any government solely for pay. Recent general discussion regarding reducing duties to perform military service in the Czech Republic between 2000 and 2005 has indicated that the sense of citizens' responsibility for the defence their country is limited, in public eyes, to the conscription only. In reality, the sphere of citizens' defence liabilities is much broader. The comprehensiveness of this issue comes to light particularly when we compare the practice in this area in different NATO nations. In this particular case, the article indicates one of possible solutions to these efforts, i.e. a systemizing approach.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

The Centres of Gravity (COG) are characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. The COG belongs among the most important operational concepts. It is the main source of power and strength. Without dermining enemy's COG we are not able to carry out any quick and resolute action, to reach ordered tasks, desired objectives. The primary purpose of this article is to offer basic information about this subject. This first part is concentrated predominantly to Carl von Clausewitz's ideas. The article especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the COG theory in confrontation with contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. It highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

Anti-ballistic missiles are missiles designed to counter enemy's ballistic missiles. First, the author compares strategic patterns reflecting various eras of the former bipolar world. Their mutual balance of that time could be described as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). As long as MAD was a fact of life, the ABM Treaty fulfilled its important function as a cornerstone of strategic stability. Keeping nuclear arsenals at a level which is not even justifiable is selfcontradictory, as the military strategy and targeting policy is based on the capability of the other side, not on its intentions. Today's Russian policy is shaped by the status-driven desire to deal with the United States from a position of power-related symmetry and strategic parity, by negating the unique position of the United States. The American ballistic missile defence policy used to be also a central element of their containment strategy towards China. However, at present, Ballistic Missile Defence (BDM) sets as a top-priory the defence against the so-called rough states, rather than against Moscow or Beijing.

The overall trend set by NATO forming small, mobile, modern and highly capable units, prepared for combat deployment whenever and anywhere - determines fundamental changes both in military materiel, arms, technologies, but also those in structures of command and control, in the field of preparation and training soldiers. Small units, company, platoon, section are to be prepared for matching the task in the whole spectrum of operational and combat activities, so that they could immediately conduct warfare after being deployed. Supported by a wide range of Allied Publication, Joint Force HQ and Doctrine Committee, Training and Doctrine Directorate, prepared together a pack of tactical publications introducing principles to support above mentioned principles. At the end there is a list of individual chapters dealing with standard principles which will guide actions of company, platoon, and section.